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I.

INTRODUCTION

Efforts at health care cost containment are common to all
industrialized nations. In most countries, governments set the framework
for such measures, and exert a certain degree of control over both the
delivery and the standard of health care. Macro-level decisions define
coverage and allocate health care funds, micro-level allocation is mostly
left to the clinical judgment of the attending providers. Since at least some
restraints on the provision of care to individual patients are exercised in all
our nations, either through specific state rationing decisions (such as
limiting the access to dialysis in Great Britain) or through budgets for
health care (as in Germany), clinical and financial considerations have
become inextricably intertwined. Physicians are increasingly moving from
"advocacy to allocation. '"' The United States Supreme Court, in its recent
ruling in Pegram v. Herdrich,2 created the term "mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions," and declared rationing to be an integral element of
the managed care approach to health care cost containment. A high-level
official of the German Ministry of Health chided physicians for chafing
against cost-based considerations imposed on them through budgets by
claiming that rationing has always been a component of clinical decision
making as resources have never been unlimited.3
1.

John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The American Health Care System, 327(10)

NEW ENG. J. MED. 742 (1992) (quoting DAVID MECHANIC, FROM ADVOCACY TO
ALLOCATION: THE EVOLVING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1986)).

2.
3.

Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000).
Dr. Schulte-Sasse, Was soll das "Geschrei der Arzte"?

"Whining"?], 26 MED. TRIBUNE 18, June 30, 2000.

[Why are Physicians

2002]

Weide

509

Macro-level allocation of health care funds is based on coverage and
medical necessity definitions, micro-level allocation involves the;
performance or denial of treatment and diagnostic procedures. Coverage is
set by contract (managed care) or by statute (Germany), specifying either
specific benefits (managed care) or general categories of services
Macro-level medical
(Germany) members4 are entitled to receive.
can be quite
documents
plan
care
necessity definitions in managed
generous and reflective of the prevailing standard of care, but on the
micro-level are operationalized through the application of restrictive
criteria for access to care. Benefits may be included in the macro-level
coverage contract and certainly covered by the promise to "provide all
medically necessary care according to good medical practice" but may still
be denied at the bedside for lack of "medical necessity." The SGB V
(Title Five of the Social Code), the foundation of the German statutory
health care system, defines both coverage and medical necessity as
Only lately, influenced by
concepts but does not use those terms.
information on managed care techniques in the United States, has "medical
necessity" found its way into the most recent German code revisions. But
in spite of apparent similarities, the cost containment approaches pursued
in these two countries is diametrically opposed. In Germany, the law
provides a general framework for the guaranteed delivery of health care
and relies on the therapeutic autonomy of the clinical decision maker. In
the United States, managed care organizations (MCOs) have implemented
an elaborate utilization management bureaucracy to control care at the
bedside.
II.

UNITED STATES: MANAGED CARE TREATMENT DECISIONS

A. The Managed Care Approach to Health CareDelivery
Almost fifty percent of all health care expenditures in the United
States are financed by the government through programs such as Medicaid
and Medicare, while sixty percent of the population are covered by private
insurers, accounting for only thirty percent of total spending.' Seventy
five percent of working Americans obtain private health insurance through
employer-sponsored plans which rely on contracts with large managed care

4. The common German term is "patient," not "subscriber" or "member," since 90% of
all Germans are covered under the statutory health care system, the remainder by private
insurance. All therefore are patients as of the first day of their lives.
5. Sheila Smith et al., The Next Decade of Health Spending: A New Outlook, 18 HEALTH
AFFAIRS, No. 4, July/August 1999 at 86.
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corporations, providing health care on a prepaid basis for a total of over
170 million individuals. 6
Managed care was initially conceived as a cost-effective alternative to
the traditional fee-for-service indemnity plans. It consisted of vertically
integrated, brick-and-mortar health care delivery systems (called HMOs)
and employed salaried providers. Today, having metamorphosed into giant
corporations, MCOs offer employers a multitude of contractual
arrangements- "products"-for the provision or arrangement of medical
care which may include an insurance and claims processing function.7
6.
Currently, 16% of Medicare beneficiaries-6.2 million among 39 million individuals
covered by the program-also receive their medical care through MCOs because the Health Care
Financing Administration temporarily assumed that managed care would help to lower costs. But
since Medicare, a system of social insurance similar to the German statutory health care system,
has attempted to curb spending, MCOs are increasingly terminating services to Medicare
beneficiaries. By January 2001, almost 1.7 million elderly patients will have their medical care
disrupted. Even though government studies have shown that Medicare is already paying MCOs
more for individual patients than it would pay for them in its fee-for-service program (all those
dropped by a MCO will revert back to the traditional Medicare coverage), Republican members
of Congress have agreed on adopting a Medicare spending package which "would pump large
sums of money into HMOs." As a representative of a managed care trade association noted,
"Medicare managed care is a program in crisis ... it needs to be rescued"; while the president
of the Greater New York Hospital Association observed, "Congress is channeling money from
hospitals on Main Street to investor-owned HMOs on Wall Street, enhancing the profits of
managed care companies without improving the delivery of services." Robert Pear, Congress
Near Deal to Raise Fee Payments to H.M.O.s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at 16. So far,
Congress has been unable to pass a "Patients' Rights Bill," regulating managed care abuses on a
national level.
7.
Most employers today, however, are "self-insured," bearing all actuarial risks while
minimizing them through reinsurance. "Self-insurance" creates a legal vacuum because §502(a),
the civil enforcement section of ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.) preempts state law causes of action for malpractice and denials of
benefits against providers and MCOs, and limits actions to benefit recovery and the clarification
of current and future rights under the plan. §514(a) preempts all state tort law claims against
employee benefit plans "relating to" ERISA plans; §514(b) "saves" from preemption any state
law regulating insurance, but §514(c) "deems" all self-insured employee benefit plans not to be
insurers, thus exempting them from state insurance regulation. The Supreme Court, however,
has reined in the preemptive reach of §514(a) by limiting the expansive interpretation of the term
"relate to" in three cases: New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995); DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. And Clinic Services Fund, 117
S.Ct. 1747 (1997); CaliforniaDivision of Labor Standards Enforcement Division v. Dillingham
Construction, 117 S.Ct. 832 (1997).
In Unun Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 119 S.Ct. 1380 (1999), the Supreme Court
weakened the scope of §514(b) by ruling that California's "notice prejudice rule" regulates
insurance and thus falls outside of this section. The Court specified that all three factors
enumerated in the McCarran-Ferguson Act defining when a business is to be considered an
insurance company are merely "checking points or guideposts."
Furthermore, after the Third Circuit ruling in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d
Cir. 1995), distinguishing between the "quality" and "quantity" of medical care, many
malpractice cases which formerly would have been preempted by §502 as actions for
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Common to all these plans is patient access to a limited network of
providers such as physicians and hospitals which receive discounted, often
capitated, fees in exchange for a higher volume of cases. Increasingly,
plans include a POS option (point of service) which permits members to
receive treatment by non-network providers but requires a higher
copayment to be paid out-of-pocket.
MCOs rely on a number of cost-containment mechanisms: primarycare gate keeping to restrict referrals to more expensive specialists;
telephone hotlines staffed by nurses to be called in emergencies to reduce
emergency room utilization; financial incentives for providers8 and
administrative staff; capitated payments shifting the morbidity risk to
providers, and utilization management, a corporation-wide complex system
designed to reduce the use of health care resources. Based on corporate
averages and/or treatment guidelines both corporate and commercial,
health care funds are micro-allocated through case-by-case preauthorization
Treatment plans
for medical procedures and hospital admissions.
submitted by providers are reviewed prospectively, followed by the
Administrative case
concurrent review of the course of treatment.
managers may deny procedures and shorten hospital stays, often contrary
to the attending physicians' recommendations. Regional and national
norms are computed and compared with the utilization data collected for
individual providers. Such "provider profiling" allows the MCO to detect
patterns of "overutilization" and the frequency with which a provider has
appealed case managers' decisions. Providers falling outside of the norms
are "deselected." Furthermore, accounting firms are called in to audit
utilization management procedures, analyze treatment and hospitalization
denial rates, and suggest areas for additional cost-savings. Increasingly,
medical decisions and guidelines are thus determined by cost-based
criteria, ignoring the clinical circumstances of individual patients, and
lowering the quality of care across the board.

administrative benefit denial, were remanded to state court. In Pegram, supra note 2, the
Supreme Court created the term "mixed eligibility and treatment decisions," defined as all
benefit decisions involving medical judgment. Health care, however, has traditionally been
reserved to state regulation. The door is now open for courts to limit ERISA preemption to the
few purely administrative coverage decisions, making available the full range of state law

remedies for patients or their survivors victimized by managed care abuse.
8.
Financial incentives include year-end bonuses or withholds from compensation to limit
the referral to specialists, and the utilization of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, as

compared with corporate benchmarks.

Financial incentives for achieving such performance

targets are often laid out in the provider contracts. In regions served by no more than one or two
MCOs where most of the insureds are members, providers have no or very limited choice but to

sign such contracts.
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While utilization management serves the micro-allocation of health
care funds on a case-by-case basis, macro-allocation occurs when
employers contract with MCOs for the provision or management of
medical services. These contracts determine eligible individuals such as
employees, spouses and children up to a certain age, and covere benefits
such as ambulatory care, hospitalization and prescription drugs.
Frequently excluded from coverage under such "plans" are preexisting
conditions, cosmetic and other "elective" surgery, mental health benefits,
"experimental" treatments such as high dosage chemotherapy and
autologous bone marrow transplants, alternative therapies, "convenience
items" such as some types of durable medical equipment, childhood
immunization, obesity treatment, in vitro fertilization, and surgery to
correct nearsightedness. These could be termed "categorical exclusions"
while "selective coverage" limits certain services under certain conditions.
Rehabilitative therapy may be covered only "when the personal physician
determines that significant improvement of a member's condition can be
expected within a period of two months." Physical, occupational, and
speech therapy may not be authorized "when there is no reasonable
expectation that the member's condition will improve over a predictable
period of time as determined by the plan."' Plan subscribers often receive
only summary
plan descriptions promising "all medically necessary
10
"
care.
9.
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY (1998). See also
Bedrick v. Travelers, 93 F.3d 149, 153-155 (4th Cir. 1996). Travelers had argued that physical
therapy for a small child with cerebral palsy was no longer a covered benefit "based upon a
finding that the specified treatments did not reach a level of potential for significant progress

which would allow the therapies to be provided on a medically necessary level." The boy's
pediatrician had given the child a fifty/fifty chance of walking by age five. The court ruled, first,
that the "significant progress" requirement was not laid down in the plan nor in any internal
corporate guidelines, and second, that "the implication that walking by age five would not be

'significant progress' for this unfortunate child is simply revolting."

Furthermore, the

application of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch Standard, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) led to

a finding of abuse of discretion by the MCO as the policy had promised as medically necessary
and covered durable medical equipment "which replaces a lost body organ or part or helps an

impaired one to work." (An upright stander is important for bone and hip joint development in a
child with cerebral palsy, and facilitates sustained neck and trunk extension.) But the court
upheld the lower court's denial of speech therapy since the policy specified that "these services
must be given to restore speech." As the child had never been able to speak, "medically

necessary or not, there is just no coverage here."
10. Micro-allocation issues have been litigated more frequently than coverage issues on a
macro level. Managed care companies micro-manage treatment on a case-by-case basis. Macro
coverage issues concern, for example, the ERISA preemption of state laws mandating standards
of care and prohibiting discrimination, and the fiduciary duties of ERISA fiduciaries such as

disclosure and avoidance of dual loyalties. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW, SARA
ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 140-41 (1997) [hereinafter
ROSENBLATT ET AL.].

2002]

Weide

513

B. Medical Necessity
Even though plan documents may promise all medically necessary
care, medical necessity determinations by the managed care company,
functioning either as the payor or the arranger of medical services, often
result in the denial of procedures recommended by the attending
physician." This raises two questions: is there a valid definition of
medical necessity, and how do managed care companies operationalize
medical necessity?
So far, no federal agency has received the mandate and resources to
propose a valid definition. For many years, however, state courts have
struggled with the issue since managed care policies are private insurance
contracts, and federal courts have ruled in employee benefit cases under
ERISA. At least one state court found that "medical necessity" was
ambiguous as a matter of law and hence, under the rules of construction
for insurance contracts, a question of fact for the jury.' 2 But no consensus
State legislatures, however, have
has emerged among the .courts.
responded to the need to prevent MCOs from denying needed care.
Today, almost half of all states have adopted statutory definitions of
"medical necessity," most of them for managed care plans, some for
Medicaid.' 3 A typical example is the definition adopted by the state of
Virginia:
"Medical necessity" or "medically necessary" means
appropriate and necessary health care services that are
rendered for any condition that, according to generally
accepted principles of good medical practice, requires the
diagnosis or direct care and treatment of an illness, injury,
or pregnancy-related condition, and that are not provided
only as a convenience. 14
Some states define the standard of care more or less restrictively:
"Treatment or care in accordance with nationally accepted current medical
criteria" (Louisiana); "Within generally accepted standards of medical care
11.

The

German

term

for

medical

necessity

is

"medizinische Notwendigkeit.

Notwendigkeit is a composite noun of Not (distress, misery, imminent danger) and the verb
wenden (to change, to turn around). As a German physician commented, "The question is how
to define distress, who should turn it around, and who should decide on both." Klaus Schnetzer,

personal communication, on file with the author.
12. ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 10, at 211, 212. Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 574
F.Supp. 547, aff'd 768 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1985).
13. PANEL PUBLISHERS, 2001 STATE GUIDE To MANAGED CARE LAW §5.1 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 STATE GUIDE To MANAGED CARE LAW].
14.

1998 Va. Acts ch. 891.
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in the community" (North Carolina); "In accordance with the prevailing
practices and standards of the medical profession and community" (Texas).
Several states mandate that medical necessity must be determined by a
physician (Louisiana, Texas, Wisconsin).' 5
C. Managed Care and The Operationalizationof Medical Necessity
1. The Use of Corporate Criteria
Even though many plans contain a seemingly appropriate contractual
definition of medical necessity (often in accordance with state law), the
procedures by which coverage is operationalized through a panoply of
(unregulated) corporate criteria determine the actual provision of medical
care. Such restrictive criteria, sometimes spelled out in policies provided
to members but often supplemented by additional internal undisclosed
guidelines, often fly in the face of the prevailing standard of care,
sometimes even in the face of logic. They have spawned a. spate of novel
lawsuits, most of them still pending, which incorporate, for example,
causes of action for breach of contract and fiduciary duty based on internal
undisclosed cost-based criteria and procedures. These result in coverage
determinations according to factors other than medical necessity, and
designed to reduce the level of medically necessary services.
The complaint in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society v. Green Spring,
Magellan,6 stated that the Provider Agreement concluded with
psychiatrists required Green Spring to "provide medically necessary health
services to patient-subscribers in a prompt and efficient manner consistent
with the standard of practice of the community in which the Provider
renders Health Services." According to the Agreement, "Green Spring's
utilization management procedures shall not diminish Provider's obligation
to render Health Services consistent with the applicable standard of care. "7
Plan documents assured patient-subscribers that, whenever medically
necessary, they would receive up to twenty outpatient treatment sessions
per calendar year, thirty inpatient days per consecutive twelve-month
period, seven days of detoxification, and thirty days of rehabilitation for
substance abuse care. The complaint alleged, however, that Green Spring
applied more restrictive internal guidelines, not disclosed to patient
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:657(D)(3)(e) (West. 2001), 40:2232(B)(5) (West. 2001);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3-200(b), 58-3-200 (2001); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, ch. 88, §
88:001 (no longer in effect); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.54(3)(d) (2001).

16. Amended Complaint (Aug. 1999), in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green Spring
Health Services, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7953 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (Civil Action No. 99-937),
vacated and remanded, 280 F.3d.378, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1816 (3d Cir. 2002).
17. Id. at 10.
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subscribers, to reduce benefits. These internal guidelines and standards,
"developed to increase profits by denying care," allegedly violated Green
Spring's obligations under the Provider Agreements, contradicted
representations made to both employer-purchasers and patientsubscribers' 8 , and routinely and systematically undermined the quality of
behavioral health care and substance abuse treatment. 9 Green Spring care
managers, for example, were said to have refused to authorize treatment
plans for another round of therapy sessions when the proposed treatment
plan was identical to the one for the sessions which had already taken
place. This rendered the provision of medically necessary and appropriate
treatment impossible for those patients who had not responded "to therapy
within the arbitrary time frame allotted to patient-subscribers by Green
Spring. "2 The management of mental illness, including substance abuse,
however, often requires longer-term treatment planning because of
therapy-resistent syndromes, comorbidity and repeat episodes-no different
from many somatic illnesses.
In spite of a number of poignant cases presented in the complaint as
He
examples, the magistrate judge found for lack of association.
recommended dismissal of the action for breach of contract, good faith and
fair dealing, interference with present and prospective economic
advantage, tortious interference with the physician-patient relationship, and
fraudulent misrepresentation. Even though acknowledging that "this case
is pregnant with issues constituent to the ongoing public debate concerning
managed health care," the magistrate judge stated that individual patients
could instead sue in their own behalf, alleging specific injuries.2 '
The Green Spring medical necessity and utilization review criteria for
residential treatment for substance abuse have recently been the subject of
18.

Id. at 25.

19. From 1988 to 1998, the employer-provided value of health benefits generally declined
by 11.5% while both in- and outpatient substance abuse benefits were reduced by 74.5%. 80%

of the participants of an American Society of Addiction Medicine annual meeting felt that
managed care had a negative impact on "the quality of care of my addicted patients." 81%
indicated that managed care also had a negative impact on their "ethical practice of addiction
medicine." Marc Gallanter, The Impact of Managed Care on Addiction Treatment: Evaluating
Physician's Views and the Value of Health Plan Benefits, 18(4) J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 1

(1999).
20. Amended Complaint (Aug. 1999) at 24, in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green
Spring Health Services, (Civil Action No. 99-937) 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7953 (W.D. Pa.
2000, vacated and remanded, 280 F.3d 378, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1816 (3d Cir. 2002).
21. Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green Spring Health Services, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8017 (2000). Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. Pennsylvania PsychiatricSoc'y
v. Green Spring Health Services, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7953 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (Civil Action
No. 99-937), vacated and remanded, 280 F.3d 378, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1816 (3d Cir.
2002).
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two lawsuits .22 Both complaints alleged that the Green Spring medical
necessity definition and medical necessity interpretive criteria were more
restrictive than the medical necessity definition in the plaintiffs' policy with
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Maryland (BCBSM), contracting with Green
Spring for mental health utilization management (prior authorization,
concurrent review and retrospective review). The following BCBSM
medical necessity definition was applicable at the time when plaintiffs'
causes of action arose:
Services and supplies by a provider to identify or treat an
illness that has been diagnosed or is suspected. They are:
a. consistent with:
(1) the diagnosis and treatment of a condition, and
(2) the standards of good medical practice;
b. required for other than convenience; and
c. the most appropriate supply or level of service.
When applied to inpatient care, the term means: the
needed care cannot be safely given on other than an
inpatient basis.23

Green Spring supplemented this medical necessity definition with
criteria for mental health treatment, including admission and continued stay
criteria for substance abuse residential treatment. The most controversial
elements were, first, a "fail first" admission requirement: "Structured
professional outpatient treatment is the treatment of first choice.
Residential treatment . . . should follow recent outpatient treatment in a

structured professional program of significant duration and intensity during
the course of which the patient has not been able to maintain abstinence for

22. Amended Class Action Complaint, Jane Doe et al. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Maryland, Inc. (Civil Action No. 183811) (Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Md., March
2000). This lawsuit for breach of contract was settled. Second Amended Complaint, John Doe
et al. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc., (Civil No. L-98-121) 173 F. Supp. 2d 398
(D. Md. Sept. 2001). The complaint alleged several causes of action under ERISA such as
failure to disclose, breach of fiduciary duty, and denial of benefits.
23. Second Amended Complaint at 5, John Doe et al. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Maryland, Inc., (Civil No. L-98-121) 173 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. Sept. 2001).
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a significant period of time."A
In other words, unless potentially
irreparable harm to the patient's personal and professional life had already
occurred, the possibly most appropriate treatment according to "good
medical practice "would not be approved and the patient would be placed
at risk for further harm."'
Second, if this requirement for residential treatment was not met, the
following conditions applied: "1) patient must be residing in a severely
dysfunctional living environment (emphasis added); or 2) there must be
actual evidence for, or clear and reasonable inference of serious, imminent
physical harm to self or others directly attributable to the continued abuse
of substances which would prohibit treatment in an outpatient setting." 2'
Since all family environments of alcoholics are marked by a certain degree
of impairment, the Green Spring criteria imposed further deterioration and
potential irreparable harm before treatment according to good medical
practice might be approved. Serious, imminent harm to self or others is an
indication for involuntary commitment and as such, an excessively
stringent and inappropriate standard for residential substance abuse
treatment.
Third, the Green Spring Medical Necessity Criteria required the
"documentation of restorative potential for the proposed admission" in
cases of repeated relapses.2' In other words, unless patients with a history
of failed treatment compliance could prove their current ability to benefit
from residential treatment, they would be assigned to a lower level of care.
But "a more appropriate clinical approach would be careful assessment and
identification of the barriers to recovery . . . Failure to address specific
recovery barriers and match the client to appropriate services and settings
only increase the human and financial cost to the client and society. "28
And lastly, the criteria for continued stay required that "all of the

24.

GREEN SPRING HEALTH SERVICES,

INC.,

GSHS MEDICAL NECESSITY

CRITERIA:

SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT 16 (1992, 1995) [hereinafter GSHS MEDICAL
NECESSITY CRITERIA].

25. Denial of "having a problem" is common among alcoholics but whenever a patient
accepts responsibility for the condition, appropriate treatment is essential for a successful
outcome. Complete "remission" from alcoholism often occurs only after several failed attempts
at recovery. Denying residential care may expose patients to failure at a time when they are most
amenable to treatment.
26. GSHS MEDICAL NECESSITY CRITERIA, supra note 24, at 17.
27.

Id.

28. LEE GARTNER & DAVID MEE-LEE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
THE ROLE AND CURRENT STATUS OF PATIENT PLACEMENT CRITERIA IN THE TREATMENT OF

SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS. 13 TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL (TIP) SERIES 15, at

17 (1995).
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admission criteria must be met "on a daily, continuing basis."29 This
requirement defies all logic of treatment-patients may not improve in
order to qualify for continued residential therapy. If they responded to
such a structured treatment approach which, by definition, spans a certain
period of time, they were no longer eligible for continued approval of the
appropriate level of care.
In 1995, the Green Spring alcohol and drug detoxification and
rehabilitation criteria for utilization review were compared by Green
Spring authors with the Patient Placement Criteria (PPC) of the American
Society of Addiction Medicine? 0 While both sets of criteria dealt with
level-of-care determinations for substance-abusing patients and included
admission, continued stay and discharge criteria, the authors emphasized
that the Green Spring medical necessity criteria were intended for
utilization management while the ASAM criteria served "a broader
treatment rationale and purpose.' 3 ' The article concluded that the ASAM
criteria "are helpful in treatment planning" but in their current form "are
not adequate in medical-necessity review for utilization management
purposes."32 The Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) of the

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, however, striving to lay
the groundwork for the development of national uniform patient placement
criteria, found that the ASAM criteria represented the "best effort to date"
and provided "a solid base upon which to build." 33 The CSAT team had
reviewed all available sets of public and private placement criteria for its
Treatment Improvement Protocol (TIP) as both public and private
treatment systems were seen as increasingly relying on PPCs. A more
standardized approach was also considered advisable since most managed
care organizations employed their own criteria attempting "to place
patients in the least restrictive and least expensive treatment setting that is
most likely to produce positive treatment outcomes. " '
The TIP
emphasized that managed care criteria were "substantially more restrictive
in regarding intensive levels of care" than the ASAM criteria. Noted
advantages of the ASAM criteria were their development by consensus
29.

GSHS MEDICAL NECESSITY CRITERIA, supra note 24, at 17.

30. Jonathan Book et al., The ASAM and Green Spring Alcohol and Drug Detoxification
and Rehabilitation Criteriafor Utilization Review, 4(3) AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 187 (1995).

Dr. Book is the current Magellan (formerly Green Spring) Medical Director in the Magellan
corporate office in Columbia, Maryland.
31. Id. at 189.
32.

Id.

33.

GARTNER & MEE-LEE, supra note 28.

34.

Id. at 11.
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among a range of clinicians (even though not as broad as might ideally be
desirable), their publication after extensive field review, and their high
visibility in the clinical arena in general.
2. The Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines
According to the Institute of Medicine, chartered by the National
Academy of Science, clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are
"systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances." 3I
Currently, more than 2,200 scientifically derived
guidelines have been developed by recognized scientific institutions
(including the former Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
AHCPR, now called Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
AHRQ3 6) and medical specialty organizations. Their use, however, is not
required by law, and MCOs are free to develop and apply their own
customized guidelines.17 As a MCO representative observed in response to
an informal survey of the use of official practice guidelines: the AHCPR
guidelines "did not seem to fit his circumstances." 38 Furthermore,
managed care organizations, "with their commitment to the bottom line,
may make modifications to guidelines to achieve their best interests and not
those of the patients."3 9 "Among these managed care guidelines, a
staggering diversity reigns. Indeed, the full extent of the variety can not
be known since many of them are proprietary, kept confidential partly to

35.

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMM. ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES,

CLINICAL

PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM (M.J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr,
eds., 1990). The IOM definition has also been adopted by German institutions and medical
specialty societies developing clinical practice guidelines.
36. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, USING CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO EVALUATE QUALITY OF CARE

(1995). Volume 1 contains a "List of attributes of good practice guidelines" and a twelve-point
checklist for guideline development, similar to the approach developed by the German

workgroup AZQ.
37. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRACTICE GUIDELINES: MANAGED CARE
PLANS CUSTOMIZE GUIDELINES TO MEET LOCAL INTERESTS 3 (1996). More than 75% of all

MCOs use at least some formally implemented guidelines.
Frances H. Miller, Medical
Malpractice: External Influences and Controls-MedicalDiscipline in the Twenty-First Century:
Are Purchasersthe Answer?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 31, 46 (1997).

38. Jane Sisk, How are Health Care Organizations Using Clinical Guidelines?, 17
HEALTH AFFAIRS, No. 5, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 91.
39.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING

anonymous expert source on guidelines).

OFFICE, supra note 37,

at

12 (quoting an
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ensure commercial salability and partly to limit physicians' ability to
'game' the system for extra benefits. "4
3. Commercial Guidelines
Managed care organizations increasingly resort to guidelines
developed by actuarial firms (Milliman & Robertson, InterQual"', Value
Health Services) for commercial purposes.4 2 The Milliman & Robertson

(M&R) guidelines, for example, are sold to a large number of MCOs
including companies such as Cigna, Prudential, United Healthcare Corp.,
and U.S. Healthcare.4 3

By

1995, the firm's

"Optimal Recovery

Guidelines" (ORGs) were applied to the treatment of more than 50 million
patients-but not without serious resistance by practitioners and the
American Medical Association, dubbing the guidelines "cookbook
medicine," sacrificing autonomous clinical judgment and the consideration
of each patient's unique circumstances. 4 In order to avoid costly referrals
to specialists or hospital stays, the extensive list of conditions to be treated
by general practitioners in Volume 5, "Ambulatory, Primary and
Pharmaceutical Care" (developed in focus groups of managed care primary
care physicians) includes heart failure, pneumonia, and epileptic seizures.
Still, the "purpose of the Guidelines is not to ration or reduce care, but
rather to help minimize waste and inefficiency in the healthcare system. "4
As the company itself consistently emphasizes in its literature, its
Healthcare Management Guidelines are "a set of optimal clinical practice
benchmarks for treating common conditions for patients who have no
complications. If you have an uncomplicated patient with a particular
40. E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits:

Restructuring the Legal

Standard of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 12 (Fall 1997) (quoting Lucian L. Leape, Translating
Medical Science Into Medical Practice: Do We Need a NationalMedical Standards Board? 273
JAMA 1534, 1536 (1995)).

41.

Miller, supra note 37, at3l, n.104.
42. An extensive search of the National Library of Medicine database revealed only a slim
1992 edition of the Milliman & Robertson Guidelines, an entry of InterQual as a publisher, and
no entry of Value Health Services. (The NLM is the largest repository of scientific medical
publications in the world.) All three corporations sell clinical practice guidelines for "medical
review services" (the precertification and concurrent review of individual patients' medical care)
to large managed care corporations.
43. Morreim, supra note 40, at 11, n.28. Since then, some of these corporations have
merged with other MCOs.
44. Allen R. Myerson, Helping Health Insurers Say No, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1995, at
Dl. Most M&R documents emphasize, however, that the guidelines should be adapted to local
standards and are not intended to supplant clinical expertise.
45. MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC.,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 3 (Apr. 1998).
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illness, here is the most-efficient, demonstrated-quality course of
treatment."- "Eighty percent of under-age 65 cases and 40% to 50% of
over-age 65 cases are generally considered uncomplicated. "'4 7

This

approach completely ignores the considerable incidence of comorbidity,
especially among the elderly.4 8

As one physician commented, "The

standards take an absurdly optimistic approach. If all the stars are aligned
in the heavens and everything turns out just right, what is the least we can
do?"49
In some cases, it appears that health plan guidelines are
based not even on average needs but on the needs of
patients in the best of circumstances. For example, in
developing benchmarks to which managed care plans
should strive, the consulting company Milliman &
Robertson based its benchmarks on the experiences of the
10% of patients in each type of treatment who needed the
least amount of care. Thus, if experience showed that
10% of patients could be discharged within one day of an
appendectomy, the benchmarks set a goal for discharging
appendectomy patients within one day of their surgery.3
Empirical studies have supported the contention that only 10% of all
hospital treatments provided meet the M&R guideline goals.5'
With hospitalization the most expensive component of health care,
guidelines focus on the projected length-of-stay for "the entire spectrum of
medical and surgical patients-regardless of the severity of the condition so

46. Id. at 1.

47. Id. at 2.
48. No guidelines adjusted for comorbidity are provided. Indeed, when developing
scientifically valid guidelines for treatments of specific conditions, comorbidity should be
excluded to prevent the results from being confounded by the effects of coexistent illnesses and
the interaction of multiple treatments.
But the Milliman & Robertson estimates of
"uncomplicated" cases, especially among those over age 65, are excessive, making the guidelines
next to useless and potentially damaging for patients. See generally MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON,
INC., supra note 45.

49. Myerson, supra note 44, at Cl (quoting Gary S. Dorfman, medical society officer and
in charge of quality and cost control at Rhode Island Hospital).
50. David Orentlicher, Paying PhysiciansMore to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit
Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, n.71 (1996). (quoting Greg Borzo, R.I. Doctors Face
"Absurd" InpatientLimits, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, at 1, 9).

51. Hirshfeld et al., Structuring Provider-Sponsored Organizations: The Legal and
Regulatory Hurdles, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 11 (1999).
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'
long as the patient does not develop complications." 52
In 1997, the
company, supporting its conclusion with six pages of tables, reported that
new mothers should be able to be released from the hospital twenty-four
hours after an uncomplicated vaginal delivery, and forty-eight hours after a
Cesarean.5 3 The report added that no health status information on mother
and newborn nor on post-discharge medical care provided had been
considered, but that "such post-discharge care is likely included as

medically appropriate for short-stay patients."i' In 1999, the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals, in In re U.S. Healthcare,55 upheld the lower court's
ruling that the twenty-four hour contractual coverage limitation of
hospitalization after delivery was a quality of care issue, and thus outside
of the scope of the ERISA preemption. Furthermore, the refusal of a
requested home visit by a nurse, a covered benefit, was also considered-a
novum for any court!-a violation of the standard of care. Since the MCO
had acted as a "medical provider", it was not immune to state law medical
malpractice claims. Today, forty-two states prohibit "drive-through"
deliveries,5'

and President Clinton's Newborns'

and Mothers'

Health

Protection Act of 1996 has been in effect since January 1, 1998.11
4. Guideline Development
How are the Milliman & Robertson guidelines developed? Precise
information on the data entering into the guidelines have been difficult to
obtain since M&R has limited itself to general statements only. In spite of
its claims that "guidelines are developed in accordance with the principles

52.

HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 45,

53.

Frederick W. Spong and Dennis J. Hulet, MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., RESEARCH

at 6.
REPORT:

HEALTH STATUS IMPROVEMENT AND MANAGEMENT HSIM EXTRACT #1 - INPATIENT

CARE FOR MOTHERS AND NEWBORNS (1997). The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists recommends two days for uncomplicated births and four days for Cesarean
sections.
German women currently spend an average of four days in the hospital for
uncomplicated deliveries.

54. Id. at 4.
55.

In re United States Healthcare, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22464. U.S. Healthcare Inc.

v. Steven Bauman, 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. June
19, 2000) (Civil Action No. 99-1383). The newborn Michelina had died of an undiagnosed
meningitis the day after she and her mother had been discharged from the hospital 24 hours after
delivery.
56.

See 2001 STATE GUIDE To MANAGED CARE LAW, supra note 13, at §3.2.

57. Id. The Act mandates a minimum stay of 48 hours after a normal vaginal delivery,
and a minimum of 96 hours after a Cesarean. Furthermore, no health plan approval is required.
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of evidence-based medicine, employing the current best evidence,"18 none
of the details customarily provided for scientifically derived clinical
practice guidelines are made available. Medical literature, especially
randomized controlled trials and observational studies in peer-reviewed
literature are cited as sources. 9 But how such data are then aggregated to
arrive at the guidelines remains a mystery.60 Another source of data for
guideline development are utilization review organizations, MCOs and
chart reviews of managed care providers. 6 ' This method relies on insurers'
own decisions instead of scientifically obtained material.62 Since all MCOs
strive to prevent health care costs from rising by applying increasingly
stringent standardized criteria, and their data are returned into the feedback
loop for guidelines updates, the standard of care follows the downward
spiral.
As M&R admits, the guidelines are targeted at the "financial
viability" of the health care system. Actuaries
help measure the financial risks associated with the
delivery of health care (e.g. utilization rates, costs, trends,
identification of opportunity, volatility, and risk).
Actuaries and clinicians together identify the clinical and
financial
opportunities
available,
translate
these
opportunities into specific clinical practices, and measure
the financial impact of changes. 6

58. James M. Schibanoff, MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON,
IMPROVEMENT & MANAGEMENT, PEDIATRIC HSIM, (1998).

INC.,

HEALTHCARE

STATUS

59.

Id.

60.

For further discussion, see id. at 33.

61.

HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note

45, at 6.
62. E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical
Malpractice,32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 983 (1999).
63. HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note
45, at 6. The 2001 edition of The Managed Health Care Handbook, edited by a partner in the
accounting firm of Ernst & Young "with one of the largest health care consulting practices in the

United States", contains three chapters contributed by authors from Milliman & Robertson. The
author of "Actuarial Services in an Integrated Delivery System" discusses how to aid HMOs to
select providers to include or exclude from contracting, how to design incentive structures to

make regular, budgeted payments or periodic bonus payments to providers from integrated
delivery system gains, the design and determination of the value of various provider capitation
arrangements, the establishment of financial benchmarks for future measurement, and the
quantification of "medical management policy." Stephen M. Cigich, Actuarial Services in an
Integrated Delivery System, in THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 971 (Peter R.
Kongstvedt, ed.) (2001).
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In 1995, eighteen in-house consultants, nine physicians and nine
nurses, "having plenty of clinical and administrative experience especially
at health maintenance organizations," were writing new standards and
revising existing ones." Proposed standards were submitted for review to
physicians working for health plans relying on the M&R guidelines but not
to medical societies "whose recommendations are invariably more
generous than Milliman's. "63 On June 13, 2000, the American Medical
Association House of Delegates adopted Resolution 822, introduced by the
New York Delegation, and formally rejected "the Milliman & Robertson
Guidelines as the clinical standard of care. "6

5. The Application of Commercial Guidelines
"Some health plans are apparently using the Milliman & Robertson
recommendations as guidelines that should be followed for all patients,
unless an extension is justified, rather than as an aspirational benchmark."67
In Batas v. Prudential, the plaintiffs alleged the formal guideline
application to virtually all subscribers to deny coverage, and without
consideration of the treating physicians' clinical judgment, despite M&R's
caveat that the guidelines are not intended as exclusive criteria." Humana
documents obtained through discovery in cases against Humana Health
Insurance and Humana Inc. confirm the trend towards rigid guideline use.69

64.

Myerson, supra note 44, at C1.

65.

Id.

66. American Medical Association House of Delegates (A-00), Report of Reference
Committee H, HOD Action: Original Resolution 822 (Rejection of Milliman & Robertson as
Standard of Care).
67. Orentlicher, supra note 50, at n.71 (quoting PRIVATE SECTOR ADVOCACY AND
SUPPORT TEAM, AM. MED. ASS'N., MANAGED CARE AND THE MARKET: A SUMMARY OF
NATIONAL TRENDS AFFECTING PHYSICIANS 2 (2d ed. 1995).
68. Plaintiff's Surreply in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Discuss the Class Action
Complaint at 17 (August 1997), in Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div.,
Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v.
The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion granted by
Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am,721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
69. Chipps v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, Fla.)
(Case No. CL 96-00423 AE) (unreported, filed 1996). The jury awarded the plaintiff $80
million, and the case was appealed to the Fourth District Florida Court of Appeals. Humana
Health Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Chipps, 748 So.2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(No. 00-866), reh"gden.
Oct. 12, 1999, aff'd in part, rev'd, and remanded by Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Chipps,
802 So.2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Price et al. v. Humana Inc., (S.D. Fla.) (Case No. 9:998763 CIV-Moreno) (unreported, filed 1999), transferred and consolidated In re Humana Inc.
Managed Care Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000), aff'd 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS (11th
Cir. 2002).
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After the quarterly earnings of Humana had dropped sharply in early
1995, the company called in the auditing firm Coopers & Lybrand for a
The Humana utilization
utilization management program audit.
management program is centrally administered out of Louisville,
Kentucky. Its main components are pre-admission review, telephone precertification, concurrent review, case management and written prior
Pre-admission review is conducted by admission
authorization.
coordinators, registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs),
and supervisors. The Coopers & Lybrand report on the effectiveness of
the utilization management program recommended, among other
procedures, the more stringent use of commercial guidelines. In order to
seize the "tremendous opportunity" of generating additional savings, the
patient care coordinators (PCCs), performing concurrent review, should be
trained to be more "proactive and aggressive when discussing
'questionable' cases with physicians, and use more aggressive utilization
criteria, such as M&R for LOS [length-of-stay] and InterQual for
continued stay review across all markets." 70 Furthermore, the nurses' role
should be expanded by assigning M&R LOS guidelines for internal
management purposes, and by more aggressively addressing "all
questionable treatment issues" during the initial contact.', "Policies for
discharge planning and case management should be reviewed, revised if
The revised
necessary and reinforced with nurses during training.
program should be supported by performance criteria and incentives for
the nurses. "72
For on-site concurrent review (OSCR), Coopers & Lybrand found
that medical necessity criteria were not applied consistently across all
markets: Chicago used InterQual SI/IS (severity of illness/intensity of
symptoms) criteria while Louisville employed the M&R guidelines. The
report recommended more "aggressive" utilization of such criteria for LOS
goals, for admission reviews and for continued stay review across all
markets was therefore recommended; training OSCR nurses in a "more
aggressive review approach"; and developing an "aggressive discharge
planning policy that supports the treatment of patients in alternative settings
The Executive Summary
even when in-patient criteria are met." 3
70.

COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P., UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT FINAL REPORT 3 (Oct.

17, 1995) (emphasis added) [hereinafter COOPERS & LYBRAND FINAL REPORT].
71.

Id.

72 . Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 24. The report went on to outline several "corporate issues" needing to be
addressed in order to improve the financial performance of the organization. "Many managed
care organizations have contractual language which stipulates they will not pay for the admission
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concluded that Humana had available a number of opportunities to improve
its competitive position through enhanced utilization performance.
Some of these recommendations require a cost benefit
analysis before implementation to document the potential
financial savings. The process could benefit from a true
Business Process Reengineering redesign. The efficiencies
gained would then free up existing resources which could
be dedicated to the implementation of some of the
recommendations in this report which will require
additional staffing."

By 1997, the Utilization Management Plan Description for San
Antonio and Other Markets listed both M&R Guidelines and InterQual
Criteria as inpatient and ambulatory care review decision protocols and
criteria for the appropriateness of medical services .7 These standards were
to be used during review for admission criteria, concurrent review,
discharge planning, and the authorization of referrals to specialists and of
special procedures. For prior authorization and pre-certification of elective
admissions, medical necessity and admission appropriateness were to be
determined by the use of "objective criteria" such as M&R and InterQual.
Under the concurrent review process, admission and continued stay review
relied on M&R Guidelines and InterQual SI/IS criteria for the
determination of medical necessity. Concurrent reviews were conducted at
specified intervals throughout the in-patient stay, assessing the member's
need for hospitalization by "using pre-established objective criteria
(InterQual, M&R, and Coverage and Referral Standards)."76 "High quality

care" is to be assured through "generic outcome screens.""
According to the Humana Medical Plan Utilization Management
Policy & Procedure Manual for the Northeast Florida market in effect until
January 1, 1997, the utilization management of mental health services,
delegated to Merit Behavioral Care, was to be monitored by Humana using
even if it was medically necessary when the hospital fails to fulfill its notice obligations.
Humana should consider adding such language to its new 'boiler plate' contracts and investigate
the feasibility of administering the new policy under its existing agreements. COOPERS &
LYBRAND FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 6.
74.

Id. at 7.

75. HUMANA HEALTH CARE, HUMANA HEALTH CARE PLAN-SAN ANTONIO AND OTHER
DESIGNATED MARKETS-UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT PLAN DESCRIPTION (as approved Mar.

28, 1997) (see Chapter entitled "Screening Criteria" at page 12).
76. Id. (see Chapter entitled "Targeted Utilization Management Strategic Plan" at page 1316).
77.

Id.
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InterQual and M&R Guidelines for the review of 100% of mental health
and substance abuse admissions . 8
The inpatient UM process (for
concurrent, prospective, and retrospective medical necessity review)
required PCCs to be "thoroughly familiar with InterQual and M&R criteria
and their applications. " 9 PCCs were to review patients' conditions by
applying appropriate InterQual criteria and M&R Guidelines "to determine
medical necessity of the admission and appropriateness of the acute setting
for concurrent stay review (see InterQual Criteria & M&R Guidelines
Manual). [PCC] enters M&R Optimal Recovery Guidelines and assigns
LOS. Enters AHDs (Avoidable Hospital Days)."80 Among the PCC
review activities, the Policies & Procedures Manual lists "onsite
admission/subsequent review of the medical record applying appropriate
InterQual criteria and M&R Guidelines to determine medical necessity of
the admission and appropriateness of the acute care setting." 8 Cases not
meeting the "IS/SI (sic) discharge screens" were to be referred to Medical
Directors or PAs (physician advisors). Continued stay reviews were to be
conducted Monday through Friday, and results obtained by applying the
above guidelines were to be documented.Y
The Utilization Medical
Director's tasks included the determination of hospital discharges, and "at
least bi-weekly 'grand rounds' for the review of all inpatients in greater
than ten days, all catastrophic cases, and all cases where Market Medical
Director intervention may result in more effective utilization, utilizing
UM/MD (utilization management/medical director) and Daily Utilization
Management Report (DUMR)."83 If the Medical Director determined that
"discharge screens are not met," concurrent reviews were to be continued
daily while all information and actions regarding the case were to be
documented in Medical. Services Review (MSR) "using SI/IS criteria
including admission criteria/discharge plan, M&R Criteria and ORGs
(optimal recovery guidelines) and LOS. "I"

78. HUMANA HEALTHCARE, INC., HUMANA MEDICAL PLAN UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT
POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR THE NORTHEAST FLORIDA MARKET 2/2 (in effect until
Jan. 1997) [hereinafter POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR THE NORTHEAST FLORIDA

MARKET].
79.

Id. at 1/7.

80.

Id. at 2/7.

81.

Id. at 3/7.

82

Id. at 4/7.

83.

POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR THE NORTHEAST FLORIDA MARKET,

78, at 4/7.
84.

Id.at 6/7.

supra note
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In its Utilization Management Report for the Kansas City and
Louisville "markets," Coopers & Lybrand related that "the case managers
are not referring to the M&R guidelines during their inpatient rounds. The
case managers use their own judgment in making decision.""5 In order to
remedy the situation, it was recommended to "reemphasize the use of
M&R and InterQual guidelines during concurrent review to ensure process
is objective as opposed to subjective", and to "document when criteria is
not met and state rationale when LOS exceeds M&R." 8 6 Another finding

was that "PCCs report that network physicians are not supportive and in
some cases are openly hostile to utilization management initiatives." 7 It
was recommended to "conduct focused educational programs with network
physicians that stress the importance of their cooperation with utilization
management initiatives. " The Executive Summary emphasized that
"PCCs attach M&R guidelines to patient charts. PCCs report that
physicians remove the guidelines and/or write inappropriate comments in
response. The Medical Director should establish an intervention with
uncooperative physicians to resolve this situation.
Uncooperative
physicians should be identified and the Medical Director should
communicate Plan expectations. " 9
In her trial testimony,90 Linda Peeno, M.D., a former medical
reviewer/physician advisor with Humana who also worked as case
management reviewer for Blue Cross in a hospital setting, 9' commented on
the above Coopers & Lybrand audits and recommendations during cross
examination:
Q.
Is there something inherently wrong with a health
care provider, like a hospital or a health insurer,
employing accountants to help them be efficient?

85.
REPORT,

COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P., HUMANA UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT DRAFT
REGION II, KANSAS CITY AND LOUISVILLE MARKETS 24 [hereinafter HUMANA

UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT DRAFT REPORT, KANSAS CITY AND LOUISVILLE].

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 12.

90.

Chipps v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, Fla.)

(Case No. CL 96-00423 AE) (unreported, filed 1996). See also supra note 69.
91. Dr. Peeno resigned because "I was concerned about the entire way the whole health
system was evolving, and I wanted to do something about the consequences to patients." Record
at 1901, in Chipps v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County,
Fla.) (Case No. CL 96-00423 AE) (unreported, filed 1996). See also supra note 69.
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Yes. The way Humana did it with the Coopers &
A.
Lybrand audit, there was something inherently wrong with
it.
And you know more than Coopers & Lybrand
Q.
does, right, in terms of their recommendations as to
efficiency?
A.
Yes. I know that they're an accounting firm that
comes in and does an audit of how these utilization
management procedures function, and the audit constitutes
what is the denial rate and how much money are you
saving, and what you do to save more money. And I read
through the voluminous report, and there wasn't a single
sentence in this entire report that addressed how patients
were being cared for, it was all cost driven. So yes, there
is something inherently wrong with having an accounting
firm come in and tell Humana how to take care of its
patients, when it's all cost driven.
Q.
Do you know how many doctors were employed
by Coopers & Lybrand for their aid and assistance in the
audit that was performed on behalf of Humana?
A.

No, not exactly. I'm sure several though.

Q.
So there were obviously medical people involved,
not just accountants. You understand that, do you not?
A.
Well, that's kind of a bizarre notion to have
medical doctors working for an accounting firm anyway,
so I mean, I think that's an inherent conflict.
Well, you have accountants working for the
Q.
That's no less
hospital with which you're affiliated.
bizarre, is it?
The accountants aren't at the bedside of patients
A.
and telling doctors what to do and making judgments about
how doctors are practicing medicine.

529
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What I think happened was they came in, they went to the
utilization management department, they said okay, how
many denials, what's your percent of denials? Well, that's
not high enough, that's not industry standard, so let's
decrease or increase the rate of denials, let's decrease how
many people you admit to the hospital, let's decrease how
many days they stay.
And then they went through and calculated and produced a
mechanism to do that. They might as well have been
standing by the bedside telling the patients they couldn't
come into the hospital, they had to leave. 9
On re-direct examination:
Q.
Dr. Peeno, if Humana was truly, truly concerned
with the quality of care of its members, how would a cost
benefit analysis apply?
A.
It wouldn't.
I mean, they would be doing
something different, they would be looking at the care of
patients, not just the cost.
Q.
Would one associate cost benefit analysis with a
'machinery of denial' and treating people like nothing
more than widgets moving down an assembly line?
A.
That's exactly-I mean, it's just like a factory.
You do a cost benefit analysis, we're going to hire these
new people, and what they're going to do is this is going to
justify the money we make or the money we lose. I mean,
it's all cost based.
Q.
And let's look at some of the issues that corporate
was reviewing, corporate issues [refers to notice provision
in new boiler-plate contracts that Humana will not pay for
a hospital admission if the hospital failed to fulfill its notice
obligation, regardless of medical necessity].

92. Record at 1904-1907, in Chipps v. Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir.,
Palm Beach County, Fla.) (Case No. CL 96-00423 AE) (unreported, filed 1996). See also supra

note 69.
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A.
This is clearly they're not acting in the best
interests of the patient. That's a little financial technicality
that they can create in order to avoid some of the hospital
costs .9

6. Commercial Guidelines in the Court Room
Because of the ways commercially sold guidelines are developed and
used, they are now cited in numerous lawsuits as violating the medical
necessity standard promised to subscribers in managed care plan
documents. In Weiss v. CIGNA, general allegations were made that the
"highly controversial" actuarial M&R guidelines had been improperly used
for medical determinations instead of generally accepted standards, as
required by the plaintiff's plan.94 The judge, however, dismissed the
breach of contract claim since Weiss had not alleged that "CIGNA relies
on such guidelines to the exclusion of other factors," nor had she alleged
an "injury in fact" arising from the company's medical necessity
determinations departing from "generally accepted medical standards."
Therefore, the case or controversy requirement for an ERISA §502(a)
claim had also not been met. Since then, claims detailing the exclusive use
of the guidelines and the scientific inadequacy of their development
resulting in standard of care violations have become increasingly specific.
The complaint filed in Price v. Humana Inc., one of several class
action suits against managed care corporations consolidated for
multidistrict pretrial proceedings in the Southern District of Florida, 5
referred to "undisclosed cost-based criteria" used by the MCOs in place of
or in addition to the medical necessity criteria set forth in the health plan
documents. It alleged actionable material omissions and misrepresentation
to the class in that the M&R guidelines, InterQual and Value Health
Services (VHS) guidelines and criteria were used for the approval or denial
of benefit claims. The complaint further alleged that such guidelines were
developed by third parties for the purpose of reducing the utilization rates
of care, and were used by Humana without regard to actual medical

93.

Id. at 1935, 1936.

94. Weiss v. CIGNA HealthcareInc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

95. The defendants are Humana Inc., Aetna Inc., Aetna U.S Healthcare Inc., CIGNA
Corp., Prudential Ins. Co., PacifiCare, and United HealthGroup, Inc.

On Oct. 23, 2000, the

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the consolidation of all actions into MDL1334-In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation. In re Humana Inc. Managed Care
Ligitation, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000).
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necessity.96 Disclosure
concerning subcontracts
restrictive criteria for
medical conditions and

documents were found devoid of information
with third parties such as VHS, using more
payment eligibility determinations for certain
procedures than the Humana medical necessity

criteria.Y

The Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Class
Certification98 listed exhibits indicating the following: "Milliman &I
Robertson guidelines are used in the review process across all markets,""
"It is the policy of the Utilization Management Department to assure that
concurrent review data entry is relevant, concise, and based on criteria
developed by Milliman & Robertson or Interqual Criteria,' 'a2 "Humana's
registered nurses use Interqual criteria for medical necessity review, '' °0
Value Health makes coverage determinations based on "clinical standards
of care (emphasis added) developed by VHS and its medical advisors,"' 0
"VHS estimates that the Medical Review System saved its clients $67.5
million in 1995. The MRS consistently resulted in a direct savings of
approximately 9% after physician review,"103 "A preadmission review
nurse

. . .

compares the indications for hospital admission or surgery with

nationally-established medical/surgical screening criteria to determine
medical necessity. ' 1°1 The Humana Job Description of a Patient Care
Coordinator in Medical Services includes: "Perform daily admission and
concurrent review for hospitalized patients using standard review criteria to
96. Complaint at 40-41, 46, in Price et al. v. Humana Inc., (S.D. Fla.) (Case No. 9:998763 CIV-Moreno) (unreported, filed 1999), transferred and consolidated In re Hwnana Inc.
Managed Care Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000), aff'd 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS (11th

Cir. 2002).
97.

Id. at 42.

98. Documents include Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification, Attachment 1 to Reply Memorandum, Exhibits to First Amended Complaint
and Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Class Certification in Price et al. v. Humana Inc.,
(S.D. Fla.) (Case No. 9:99-8763 CIV-Moreno) (unreported, filed 1999), transferred and
consolidated In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000), aff'd
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS (l1th Cir. 2002).

99. Id. at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Coopers & Lybrand Utilization Management, Aug. 14,
1996, at 9).
100. Id. at Appendix Exhibit 28

(Humana Health

Care Plans Policies/Procedures.

Documents Concerning Humana's Use of Undisclosed Cost-Based Criteria).
101. Id. at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Coopers & Lybrand Humana Medical Affairs Department
Review, Nov. 21, 1996, at 14).
102. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 98, at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Humana Inc. and Value Health Services Medical Review

System Agreement, Nov. 15, 1990, at 2).
103. Id. (Value Health Sciences Corporate Overview, 1997).
104. Id. (Humana Physician's Administration Manual, GL-2, May 1996).
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determine the medical necessity and appropriateness of care. A PCC must
have an active LPN/RN [licensed practical nurse/registered nurse] license,
BSN preferred,"'' 5 "Primary care physicians receive regular reports
outlining the utilization of health care services for their patient panel . . .
Profiles are developed to identify aberrant practice patterns and who may
require orientation, counseling, education, corrective actions or
sanctions," 06 and

The physician targeting program [emphasis added] selects
HMO primary care physicians or staff model centers
where the inpatient utilization exceeds preestablished norm
. . . The performance of the targeted physicians is
reviewed every four to six weeks by Dr. Langford [sic] . .
. The Executive Director and Medical Director of each
market are then notified about which physicians are on the
target lists.'°0

In Batas, Vogel v. Prudential,'°80 a class action suit currently before the
Appellate Division, New York Supreme Court, the complaint on behalf of
all subscribers of health care plans offered by Prudential alleged that the
MCO breached its contract with subscribers by using medical necessity
determination procedures, based on the M&R length-of-stay criteria,'°9 and
in violation of the prevailing standard of care, expressly or impliedly
promised in the subscriber agreements. In the agreement entered into by
Musette Batas, representative of the standard contracts for Prudential

105. Id.
106. Id. (Utilization Management Plan Description, 1997, at 26).

107. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 98,. at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Coopers & Lybrand Humana Utilization Management
Program, at 15).
108. Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion grantedby Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. ofAm, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
109. Prudential entered into licensing agreements with M&R in 1992 and 1995, eventually
comprising all guideline volumes and their electronic versions. See Letter from M&R to Steven
Udvarhelyi, M.D., Vice President, Medical Services, The Prudential Insurance Company of
America (Feb. 26, 1992), Letter from M&R to Kay Volkert, Manager, Medical Services,
Utilization Management, The Prudential Insurance Company of America (Oct. 13, 1995),
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class Certification, at 5, n.6 (Sept. 21, 1999), all
available in Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion granted by Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
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plans, services and supplies not needed nor appropriately provided were
excluded from coverage. The contract specified:
For the purposes of this exclusion, a service will be
considered both "needed and appropriately provided" if
PruCare determines that it meets each of the following
requirements:
It is furnished or authorized by a ParticipatingPhysician

for the diagnosis or the treatment of a sickness or injury or
for the maintenance of a person's good health [emphasis
added].
The prevailing medical opinion within the appropriate
specialty of the United States medical profession that it is

safe and effective for its intended use, and that its omission
would adversely affect the person's medical condition
[emphasis added].
It is furnished by a provider with appropriate training,
experience, staff and facilities to furnish that particular
service or supply [emphasis added].11°
The contract also listed the sources to be relied on when determining
whether the above requirements have been met: published authoritative
medical literature; regulations and reports issued by government agencies
such as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR),11' the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA); and listings in the American Medical Association Drug
Evaluations, and The United States Pharmacopeia Dispensing
2
Information. 1,
The lower court upheld the fraud and breach of contract claims
against Prudential. The complaint, distinguishing the case from Weiss v.
CIGNA, "I detailed the alleged exclusive use of the M&R guidelines for
medical necessity determinations in spite of the actuarial firm's statement
that they are not intended to replace the treating physician's clinical
110. Id. at3.
111. Now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
112. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 98, at Appendix Exhibit 28 (Humana Health Care Plans Policies/Procedures.
Documents Concerning Humana's Use of Undisclosed Cost-Based Criteria, at 3).
113. Weiss, 972 F. Supp. 748.
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judgment. 14 Furthermore, it alleged that the guidelines were rigidly
applied by a Prudential concurrent review nurse to limit the plaintiffs'
hospital length-of-stay without consideration of her individual
circumstances, and against the vehement opposition of the attending
physicians, "participating physicians" under the plan. The Memorandum
of Law in Support of the Motion for Class Certification also alleged that
Prudential adopted a company-wide policy for its utilization review staff
for all plans to rely on the M&R guidelines,", and conducted uniform
training for guideline use."16 Preauthorization personnel was held to
evaluate the medical necessity of hospital admission "by using the M&R
guidelines and the Prudential Medical/Surgical guidelines," then to use
"M&R guidelines to determine appropriateness of setting and length of
stay (LOS).""' Once a patient was hospitalized, concurrent review nurses
were to decide whether the preauthorized length of stay may be exceeded.
When making such medical necessity determinations, the nurses could
consult with Prudential Medical Directors who orally confirmed "denials
of care without examining any medical records, examining the patients or
consulting with the patient's treating physician. '""I Medical Directors were
authorized to deny care based on the M&R guidelines for cases outside of
their own specialty:
a psychiatrist refused to extend Ms. Vogel's
hospitalization after she had undergone a complicated hysterectomy for the
removal of uterine tumors, weighing over three-and-a-half pounds.
The decision to discharge Ms. Vogel only two days after her
hysterectomy (in agreement with the M&R recommendation) was opposed
by Dr. Vetere, Ms. Vogel's attending surgeon, a gynecologist with 20
years of surgical experience and Assistant Professor of Clinical Obstetrics
and Gynecology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
114. Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The PrudentialIns.
Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion grantedby Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
115. supra note 94, at 5.
116. Id. at6.
117. "Operating Procedures, Preauthorization of Schedule Inpatient Services" for PruCare
of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut (Apr. 17, 1996). Memorandum of Law in Support of

Motion for Class Certification at 6 (Sept. 21, 1999). Both available in Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001), motion grantedby Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
118. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification,

supra note 98, at Appendix Exhibit 5 (Coopers & Lybrand Humana Utilization Management
Program, at 15).
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A surgical case with Ms. Vogel's specific circumstances is
at increased risk for significant postoperative complications
.... Although one or two of these complications might be
evident with 48 hours of surgery, the vast majority will not
produce signs of symptoms for at least four to five days
postoperatively.

" 119

Generally accepted medical practice following Ms. Vogel's
complicated surgery required "around the clock monitoring and evaluation
by experienced gynecological nurses and resident gynecological physicians
in addition to the one or two daily postoperative visits made by the
attending surgeon" for at least five days. According to Dr. Vetere, such
care is essential because the patient may develop complications not
amenable to self-diagnosis, leading to costly delays of the needed medical
attention.

120

In the course of the appeals procedure initiated by Ms. Vogel, Dr.
Vetere was informed by the Chief Medical Officer of Prudential that the
company, based exclusively on the M&R guidelines, had preauthorized a
two-day hospitalization for a total abdominal hysterectomy.'' Prudential's
refusal to continue coverage after two days complied with the Concurrent
Review Nurse's decision. "Remarkably, no effort was made to either
examine the patient or discuss her condition with me. "'2
Aside from the fact that I disagreed with the medical
conclusions reached by Prudential's Concurrent Review
Nurse concerning the medical needs of my patient, I also
object to the process used by Prudential for reaching and
implementing this decision. In particular, it is a gross
violation of acceptable medical protocols for a medical
necessity determination such as this to be made by
119. "These complications include, but are not limited to, postoperative hemorrhage,
including retroperitoneal and/or wound hematoma (with or without infection), seroma, bowel and
bladder dysfunction, wound infection, wound separation, pelvic cellulitis, tubo-ovarian abscess,

and pelvic thrombophlebitis with or without pulmonary embolism. Although most of these
complications are uncommon, some are life-threatening if not discovered and treated early."
Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, at 4 (July 30, 1997), in Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div.,
Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v.
The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion granted by
Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) [hereinafter
Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere].

120. Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere, supra note 119, at 4-5.
121. Id. at Exhibit 4 (dated June 28, 1996).
122. Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere, supra note 119, at 8.

2002]

Weide

537

someone who is not even a physician, let alone one who is
trained and experienced in the medical condition at issue .
. .Moreover .... Prudential did not even consult with a
trained gynecologist with experience in these types of
operations prior to deciding that further hospitalization was
not medically necessary. 3
*

Musette Batas, another example among Dr. Vetere's patients for
improper Prudential "interference with the practice of medicine" and
whose "health was threatened as a result of Prudential's improper
conduct," ' 14 suffered from Crohn's disease, a painful, potentially lifethreatening bowel disease. When six months pregnant, her baby at risk as
well, she was hospitalized for severe pain, but in spite of persistent severe
pain, had to be discharged after two days because Prudential refused
additional coverage. Barely one week later, she was readmitted through
the emergency room. One of Dr. Vetere's colleagues immediately applied
for permission to perform an exploratory laparotomy. Two days and
several phone calls later, the hospital having been told that the request was
"pending" and "waiting for Prudential's bureaucratic machinery to move,"
the patient's intestine burst, requiring immediate emergency surgery.
Because of the considerable risk of infection, her life was at stake. In
addition, the attending surgeon did not expect the baby to survive, and if it
would, felt that brain damage might occur. 12, Four days after the initial
request for exploratory surgery authorization and two days after the
emergency procedure, Prudential approved the exploratory surgery. Four
days after the emergency surgery, the Concurrent Review Nurse called the
attending surgeon's office to "demand" the patient's discharge. Only after
the physician "expressed outrage at this decision, explaining to Ms ...

123. Id. at 7, 8. In addition, Dr. Vetere received a letter from Prudential, indicating that a

company physician wanted to discuss his apparent dissatisfaction with his "contracted status as a
participating physician in the Prudential network", and the desire to speak with the head of Dr.
Vetere's department at S.U.N.Y. to confirm whether Dr. Vetere was speaking on behalf of the
department when complaining to the Prudential Executive Director about the handling of Ms.

Vogel's case. Id. at Exhibit 2 (dated May 31, 1996). "I took this request as a veiled threat that
she could retaliate against me for objecting to Prudential's mistreatment of my patient." Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 8.
125. Affidavit of Musette Batas in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, at 6, 10 (Aug. 4, 1997), in Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App.
Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by
Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion

granted by Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
[hereinafter Affidavit of Musette Batas].
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[the Concurrent Review Nurse] that I was barely out of surgery, was
pregnant and was seriously ill, Prudential backed down. "126
One week later, the same nurse decided, based on a review of the
medical chart and "internal guidelines" never disclosed to the patient, that
she had to leave the hospital. The patient acquiesced, fearing the financial
burden of out-of-pocket payments for continued hospitalization. In his
affidavit, Dr. Vetere disputed Prudential's
right to make such critical medical determinations based on
third party guidelines that are not even interpreted by
properly trained physicians . . . [h]ad I acted with regard

to may patient as it [Prudential] had, I would have
committed an act of malpractice.
In my opinion,
Prudential has done just that.' 27
Dr. Vetere's office manager eventually reported to Prucare the
physicians' dissatisfaction with the way the company's medical
management division had handled five patients, both plaintiffs included.
"We have been told on more than one occasion that 'it doesn't matter how
the patient feels or what the doctor feels is medically necessary, it is what
Prucare feels is medically necessary."'2,
Johnson v. Humana 29 also concerned a hysterectomy. Karen Johnson

was diagnosed with cervical cancer in situ with endocervical gland
extension.
Even though her attending physicians considered a
hysterectomy medically necessary, Humana only approved a cervical
conization. Ms. Johnson paid for the recommended procedure out-ofpocket."10 Prior to the denial, she was called by Humana nurses who, in a
recorded conversation, asked questions prompted by the VHS software to
derive a "profile" which was faxed to VHS reviewers in California, all of
them non-practicing physicians. The reviewers generally made treatment
decisions without evaluating patients' medical records, followed
instructions not to speak with them, and denied or approved claims after
a-taped-interview with the treating physician, and a brief review of the
126. Affidavit of Musette Batas, supra note 125, at 7.
127. Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere, supra note 119, at 10.
128. Id. at Exhibit 5 (dated April 18, 1996).
129. Johnson v. Humana Health Plan, (Jefferson Circuit Ct., Ky.) (Case No. 96-CI-00462
(Jan. 23, 1997) (unreported).
130. For the approved conization, an out-patient procedure, Humana would have had to
spend $787, a discounted $7,000 for the in-patient hysterectomy. Ms. Johnson, who did not
receive a discount, was charged more than $14,000.
Brief for Appellee Johnson, at 4, in
Humana Health Plan v. Johnson (Ky. Ct. App.) (Case No. 99-CA-166) (unreported) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellee Johnson].
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"profile." Also, Humana instructed Ms. Johnson not to obtain a second
opinion even though more than ninety gynecologists would have been
available for second opinions, based on an actual examination of the patient
and of her record for less than what Humana paid VHS.' 3' Humana thus
relied on the VHS denial even though the VHS contract advised that the
medical review system is "not intendedas a replacement for the exercise of
medical judgment by the treating health care professional."
VHS
furthermore pointed out that "there is no assurance that every variable that
may bear on appropriateness or effectiveness is known or has been
considered by VHS, that the course of treatment is ideal or appropriate for
any particular covered person, or that any treatment will be successful."132
The Brief for Appellee stated that Humana had identified
hysterectomies as "high-cost" and contracted with Value Health Services
(VHS) to review treatment requests for such procedures.'33 The denial rate
was a consistent 25%, compared with a national average of 1.2% for
patients with Ms. Johnson's condition.
One of the VHS physician
reviewers admitted that, based on the VHS computer program and
company policy, no patient with Ms. Johnson's condition would be
approved for a hysterectomy without having undergone a conization first.'31
National Cancer Institute guidelines, however, consider a hysterectomy the
appropriate treatment for patients with the plaintiff's condition.
Furthermore, an expert testified at trial that a hysterectomy was the
standard of care and the cure for Ms. Johnson's stage zero carcinoma,
compared with a recurrence rate of over 30% for conization.'33
In addition, none of the VHS reviewers were aware of Humana's
medical necessity definition, and, as a consequence, "used their own
definitions of the standard of care rather than what language was contained
131. Id. at 3, n.5, 11.
132. Id. Leslie D. Michelson, however, then Chairman and CEO of VHS and one of its
founders, underlined the following virtues of the Medical Review System: "It uses very specific,
very scientific criteria that would distinguish between candidates -who would benefit from a
medical procedure, and those who would be adversely affected by it." Ronald Shinkman,
Enterprise: Computers Get Into Disease Management, 17 L.A. BUS. J. 1, No. 34, Aug. 21,

1995. In 1996, Mr. Michelson added, "A system such as the MRS is valuable because the
medical community doesn't always have enough current information to know precisely what
interventions are optimal for which patients and when. Healthcare technology is evolving with
unprecedented speed. The MRS helps physicians stay on top of all of those developments." PR
Newswire, One Millionth Case Goes Through Value Health Sciences' Medical Review System,
FIN. NEWS (May 20, 1996).
133. Brief for Appellee Johnson, supra note 130, at 3.

134. Id. at 5. This means in practice that a patient must have a recurrence of her cancer
before a hysterectomy will be approved.
135. Id. at 6, 8.
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in her [Ms. Johnson's] own contract with Humana." 3 6 Dr. Lankford,

Humana Senior Vice President for Medical Affairs at the time, testified:'
Q.
Does it disturb you at all if I told you that the
doctors at VHS did not understand the definition of
medical necessity in Karen Johnson's contract of
insurance?
No, we didn't ask vendors to understand our contracts.
That was part of keeping the administrative process back
here, both the overview of the material and any negative
decision making had to be here because that all had to be
done internally. We just asked the outside vendors for
clinical expertise - (emphasis added)

So it did not matter to you whether they were applying a
different definition of medical necessity than was in her
contract?
No. I don't care what they thought about that issue. My
phyisician director would have clarified it and made the
right final decision, that's what their job was here.
Would it matter to you at all if Doctor Maroc testified that
in this case that he does not - he did not know at the time
he reviewed Karen Johnson's case what the definition of
medical necessity was in her contract?
A.
Each of-the management process was to look at
the contracts before denying it. So if there was anything
unusual from what he had been taught, it would have been
flagged to him. Whether or not he reviewed the actual
document is-is not the issue. There was a process for
him to do it. I didn't have the physicians look at individual
contracts, the staff did that in the department.
Dr. Maroc, the Humana physician responsible for the final treatment
"review" decision who relied on the VHS denial, defined medical necessity
during deposition as "a situation where care needs to be provided to
136. Id. at 3.
137. Deposition of Ronald D. Lankford at 156, 157 (Dec. 15, 1997), in Johnson v. Humana
Health Plan, (Jefferson Circuit Ct., Ky.) (Case No. 96-CI-00462 (Jan. 23, 1997) (unreported)
[hereinafter Deposition of Ronald D. Lankford].
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prevent loss of life or limb or to prevent excessive morbidity from
occurring."'8 He admitted that he was unaware of the definition laid down
in the patient's insurance policy ("I didn't pay any attention to the
insurance agreement" 19): •
To be medically necessary a service or supply must be:
consistent with the symptoms or diagnosis and
A.
treatment of the member's sickness and injury; and
B.
appropriate with regards to the standards of good
medical practice.
Dr. Lankford later testified:
. . . Medical necessity as he [Dr. Maroc]
A.
mentioned is an issue to do with the cost of doing the
therapies. So there is always a certain rate of mortality
and morbidity associated with treatments and that has to be
balanced in some fashion with the outcomes. ... And then
as we formalize things in the practice guidelines, or in this
case using the VHS system which was a formalized
practice guideline system, you rely on that system to
consistently make that decision.

Does Dr. Maroc's definition of medical necessity
Q.
have anything to do with whether or not the procedure is
consistent with good medical practice?
A.
Dr. Maroc's decision was not critical in this case.
The clinical decisionmaking was by a screening process in
the VHS system, followed by the clinical review by the
physicians that were board-certified and ... were familiar
with the VHS system. Dr. Maroc's part of the job was to
ensure that the processes in that department were going
well relative to how the reviews were done . . . . He was
not making clinical decisionmaking.1 "

138. Id.

139. Deposition of James A. Maroc, at 101 (Jan. 23, 1997), in Johnson v. Humana Health
Plan, (Jefferson Circuit Ct., Ky.) (Case No. 96-CI-00462 (Jan. 23, 1997) (unreported).
140. Deposition of Ronald D. Lankford, supra note 137, at 159-60.
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None of the Humana physicians participating in the decision making
process were gynecologists, nor were they in practice.' They received a
salary of $100,00 plus $5,000 bonuses for limiting hospital admissions and
lowering the numbers of hospital days of Humana patients. For denying
Ms. Johnson's four-day hospitalization for a hysterectomy, Dr. Maroc was
compensated with two such bonus payments. 42

The Circuit Court jury

found the Humana denial of the hysterectomy to be an act of bad faith, and
awarded the plaintiff $14,000, the cost of the procedure, $100,000 for
mental suffering, and $13 million in punitive damages. The case
reportedly was settled for more than $2 million."3

For the first time, a lawsuit has now been filed directly against one of
the vendors of commercial guidelines, the actuarial firm Milliman &
Robertson. The plaintiffs in Cleary, Riley v. Milliman & Robertson,'" two
pediatricians, are suing the company for defamation, appropriation of
name, tortious interference with contract of employment, civil conspiracy,
and fraud and deceit. According to the complaint, M&R listed both Drs.
Cleary and Riley 45 without their consent as contributing authors of the
pediatric guidelines, published in 1998.146 In their affidavits, both
physicians stated that at no time were they made aware of nor did they give
their approval for the use of their names and professional reputations (the
volume lists both plaintiffs as the only experts in their respective fields) in
support of the M& R pediatric guidelines.14 7 On November 13, 1999, a

141. When Humana hired Dr. Maroc, the corporation was aware that his license was on
probation in Iowa, and that he was not licensed to practice medicine in Kentucky. Nineteen
months later, at the time of the court proceedings, his status had not changed. Johnson v.
Humana Health Plan, (Jefferson Circuit Ct., Ky.) (Case No. 96-CI-00462 (Jan. 23, 1997)

(unreported).
142. Id.
143. 4(18) Mealy's Managed Care Liability Report 15 Sept. 29, 2000.
144. Plaintiffs First Amended Petition, in Cleary v. Milliman & Robertson, (Dist. Ct.,
Harris County, Tex.) (Case No. 99-56719) (unreported, decided 2000) [hereinafter Plaintiff's
First Amended Petition].
145. Thomas G. Cleary, M.D., is Board Certified in Pediatrics and Pediatric Infectious
Diseases with the American Academy of Pediatrics. He is tenured Professor of Pediatrics,

Division of Infectious Diseases, at the University of Texas Medical School, Houston. William J.
Riley, M.D., is Board Certified in Pediatrics and Pediatric Endocrinology with the American
Academy of Pediatrics. He was tenured Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Texas Medical School, and currently serves as Vice President of Medical Education at Driscoll

Children's Hospital in Corpus Christi, Texas.
146. Schibanoff, supra note 58.
147. Affidavit of Thomas C. Cleary (Nov. 11, 2000) in Cleary v. Milliman & Robertson,

(Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex.) (Case No. 99-56719) (unreported, decided 2000) [hereinafter
Affidavit of Thomas C. Cleary]; Affidavit of William J. Riley (Nov. 10, 2000) in Cleary v.
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temporary injunction ordered M&R to cease publication of the Health Care
Status Improvement & Management (HSIM) showing both plaintiffs as
contributing authors.
The amended complaint'"4 asks for exemplary
damages under the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, for punitive
damages, and a full injunction against M&R to cease use and publication of
plaintiffs' names as well as a recall from the stream of commerce all
PediatricHSIM volumes listing them as contributing authors.
Both plaintiffs have denounced the guidelines as seriously flawed and
dangerous to pediatric patients. Dr. Cleary, after examining the proposed
guidelines pertaining to infectious diseases sent to him by Dr. Yetman, one
of the defendants, had provided the feedback that "the proposed guidelines
were dangerous and would harm kids. I recall that my words to him were
that 'children may die because of these guidelines.""14 9 He added in his
affidavit,
The published PediatricHSIM are seriously flawed in their
approach to in-patient pediatric care. In my professional
opinion, the guidelines, overall, have a tendency to
mislead the user by understating the actual length of stays
that are required and are appropriate for seriously ill
children. In regard to my particular area of medical
specialty, there are in-patient guidelines and goal lengths of
stay for multiple serious pediatric infectious diseases that
are severely out-of-line with the standard of pediatric care.
As written, these guidelines pose significant risks of harm,
Dangerous
death and/or serious injury to children.
guidelines include those for: endocarditis, brain abscess,
septic arthritis, osteomyelitis, neonatal sepsis, neonatal
meningitis, and meningitis in the older child. 11
For some illnesses, Dr. Cleary would recommend six weeks of
hospitalization while the guidelines suggest three days.' 1 The pediatrician

Milliman & Robertson, (Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex.) (Case No. 99-56719) (unreported,
decided 2000) [hereinafter Affidavit of William J. Riley].
148. Plaintiff's First Amended Petition, supra note 144.
149. Affidavit of Thomas C. Cleary, supra note 147, at 2; Plaintiffs First Amended
Petition, supra note 144.
150. Affidavit of Thomas C. Cleary, supra note 147, at 2.
151. Mary Flood, Doctors Say Book Misused Their Names, THE WALL STREET J., Nov.

17. 1999, at T1.
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also found "at least one risky recommendation on each page of the 400page document. "
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Dr. Riley, who had been asked to write and review two pediatric
endocrinology sections, assumed that the project had been abandoned since
he received no response to his first draft. In his affidavit, Dr. Riley
"vehemently" disagreed with and disavowed in particular the guideline
concerning the in-patient care of diabetic ketoacidosis:
This section, as published, poses a significant risk of harm
to pediatric patients who might suffer from diabetic
ketoacidosis. In fact, the Guidelines suggest that for
admission to ICU for coma from this condition that the
goal length of stay is (1) day. This is so clearly outside of
any reasonable approach to the standard of care as to be
wholly reckless, without regard to the safety of any child
with severe DKA. I am professionally and personally
shocked and distraught that my name would be listed as the
only endocrine pediatric specialist on a volume that
contains such an outrageously irresponsible and dangerous
recommendation." 3
Both physicians expressed mental anguish, embarrassment and
humiliation arising from the association of their names and reputations with
guidelines posing potential harm to children.
An additional possibly revealing aspect of the legal action is the
question whether M&R "tried to buy scientific legitimacy by giving
$100,000 to the pediatrics department at University of Texas Houston in
exchange for the schools stamp of approval."1' 4 The department is listed as
the co-presenter of the PediatricHSIM in the first sentence of the preface'"5
but what precise role it actually played in the issuance of the guidelines and
whether some of the faculty were manipulated into becoming contributing
authors remains to be seen. Dr. Cleary suspected that M&R might have
wanted the cachet of medical school research to stave off "a firestorm of
anger" at the proposition that pediatric care might be withheld for cost152. Ron Nissimov, Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous," HOUSTON
CHRON., March 5, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called
"Dangerous ".
153. Affidavit of William J.Riley, supra note 147, at 2.
154. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous," supra note 152.
155. Ron Nissimov, Judge Tells Firm to Explain How Pediatric Rules Derived, HOUS.
CHRON., Nov. 3, 2000, at A35 [hereinafter , Judge Tells Firm to Explain How PediatricRules
Derived]. Upon request by the UT-Houston Medical School, M&R has refrained from naming it
in subsequent HSIM editions.
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containment purposes.- 6 Even though the Pediatric HSIM is intended to
"communicate best practices in pediatrics, ... developed in accordance with
the principles of evidence-based medicine, employing the current best
evidence"',", the methodology by which the guidelines were derived
remains unknown and, according to the Texas Pediatric Society, fails to
meet the standards set by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
Agency for Health Care Policy.'"8 Dr. Cleary has denied the existence of
data or clinical studies showing the safety of the recommendations which
were "pulled out of thin air."'' 9 The Texas Pediatric Society expressed
hope that potential methodological flaws of guideline development would
be revealed in the course of discovery to public and professional scrutiny.' 6
In response to plaintiffs' request for production of documents, M&R
considered the following material "confidential, proprietary and trade
correspondence with any pediatric association;
secret information":
corrections, recommendations, and/or suggested changes made by any
pediatric association; and agreements and contracts with such
associations.' 6 On the same grounds, the company objected to the
production of information relating to the medical cost savings to be
attained by customers or users of M&R's new generation of HSIM,
including the PediatricHSIM. It further rejected as "overbroad, unduly
burdensome, and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence" requests for the production of copies of "any and all
epidemiology studies, analysis, or statistical analysis or study done that
supports, references, discusses or refers to any factual, medical and/or
scientific explanation underlying M&R's representation that its Pediatric
HSIM December 1998 volume comprises 'evidence-based medicine.'"
M&R pointed to the references "made to hundreds of published studies and
analyses in various areas of pediatrics."' 62 The same objection and
references to cited publications were made to requests for copies of
epidemiological studies, statistical analysis, studies or other analytical,
156. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous,

"

supra note 152.

157. Schibanoff, supra note 58.

158. Texas Pediatric Society, Memo from the Texas Chapter of the American Academy of
Pediatrics (AARP), to Joe Sanders, M.D., Executive Director, AAP (June 14, 2000).
159. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous, " supra note 152.
160. Texas Pediatric Society, supra note 158.

161. Defendant Milliman & Robertson, Inc.'s Response to Plaintiff's First Request for
Production at 3, (Feb. 2, 2000), in Cleary v. Milliman & Robertson, (Dist. Ct., Harris County,
Tex.) (Case No. 99-56719) (unreported, decided 2000) [hereinafter Milliman & Robertson's

Response to Plaintiffs First Request for Production].
162. Defendant Milliman & Robertson, Inc.'s Response to Plaintiffs Second Request for
Production, (Feb. 2, 2000) Plaintiffs First Amended Petition, supra note 144.
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scientific and/or statistical work to support or arrive at the HSIM's goal
length of stay (GLOS) recommendations, and for studies in support of the
representation that the guidelines concern the healthiest 85% of the
pediatric population and not the remaining sickest 15 %.163

The Preface to the PediatricHSIM correctly points out that published
empirical studies are not available to validate all medical procedures.
Meta-analyses, however, detect trends represented by a large number of
studies employing somewhat different methodologies but dedicated to the
same subject matter. At least some of the "hundreds of studies and
analyses" cited by M&R could have been examined by meta-analysis for
guideline development and validation. For the GLOS, much less complex
statistical tests could have yielded results revealing prevailing practices.'6
Furthermore, a model could be developed to adjust for "inefficiencies" in
the delivery of health care to arrive at the "best practices" ("not the
median, not the average"' 65), which M&R claims to represent. Since this
would equal original research and could stimulate additional research,
there would be no reason to conceal it from the public and the scientific
community.
On November 1, 2000, the district judge presiding over the Cleary v.
Milliman & Robertson proceedings, ordered the company to respond to
questions concerning the methodology for the development of certain
pediatric care recommendations. Company officials had refused to reveal
this information during depositions upon the advice of counsel. The judge
did not preclude the possibility that questions relating to the origin of other
M&R guidelines might be appropriate in the future. '6
Information concerning M&R guideline development would then
support or invalidate the company's claim of scientific validity. Several
recent publications shed some light on their clinical usefulness. The

163. Milliman & Robertson's Response to Plaintiffs First Request for Production, supra

note 161.
164. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous," supra note 152. (showing a

simple calculation by the American College of Surgeons (ACS) of actual average stays for five
surgical procedures as suggested by 1,000 of its members, compared with the actual average
stays throughout North Carolina (N.C.) in 1996, and the M&R recommendations, yielded the
following results: mastectomy: ACS 2.5, N.C. 2.7, M&R 0; appendectomy: 5, 3.5, 1; radical
hysterectomy; 9, 5.9, 2; coronary artery bypass: 5, 8.3, 3; esophagectomy; 13, 12.9, 5,
ANNALS OF SURGERY, vol.228 No.4, Oct. 1998).
165. Jim Schibanoff, Presentation on Development and Implementation of Managed Care
Guidelines at 9, University of Texas, Houston Medical School (May 13,1997) (transcript
available at Houston Medical School, Department of Pediatrics).
166. Judge Tells Firm to Explain How PediatricRules Derived, supra note 155.
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private HCIA-Sachs Institute' 6 released the results of two studies,
comparing the M&R pediatric length of stay (LOS) guidelines with 1998
data for 3.5 million pediatric discharges at 2,400 general, non-federal
hospitals for forty-five pediatric conditions; and the LOS for the same
pediatric conditions at the Institute's 100 Top Hospitals.1'6 While M&R
considers 85% of all cases as "uncomplicated," the HCIA-Sachs studies
adjusted for four severity levels using the All Patient Refined Diagnosis
Related Groups (APR-DRGs). 6 9 Contrary to the M&R guidelines, this
system of classification accomodates the severity of the underlying illness,
of the comorbidity and complicating conditions. Across syndromes, 74%
of cases were found to correspond to the baseline severity level. Among
conditions, however, the percentage of low-severity patients ranged from70
18% (drug withdrawal syndrome) to 99% (slipped femoral epiphysis).
75 % of all complicated and 64% of all uncomplicated cases had LOS
exceeding the M&R GLOS. For uncomplicated cases, the LOS varied by
condition, exceeding the M&R GLOS by 9% for epiglottis to 88% for
bacterial meningitis. For twenty-seven of forty-five pediatric conditions
examined, more than 50% of the LOS for uncomplicated cases exceeded
the M&R GLOS. For diabetic ketoacidosis (n=4,955), the HCIA-Sachs
Institute found an average LOS of 2.9 (median 2, mode 2) while M&R
recommends one day. All LOS at the hospitals included in the study
exceeded the M&R GLOS (complicated cases 92%, uncomplicated 80%,
all 81%), thus supporting Dr. Riley who had called the one-day hospital
stay for DKA "wholly reckless, without regard to the safety of any child."
The authors of the study concluded that
the consequences of encouraging clinicians to reduce LOS
to the Milliman & Robertson GLOS are of particular
In all conditions, clinicians need the latitude
concern ....
to extend the LOS for patients with certain comorbid or
167. HCIA-SACHS INSTITUTE, COMPARISON OF MILLIMAN AND ROBERTSON PEDIATRIC
LENGTH OF STAY GUIDELINES (2000) (consulting firm in Evanston, IL, rates hospitals to
produce a list of the 100 Top Hospitals in the country, based on efficiency and quality of care.
Through its Clinical Research Program, the Institute conducts clinical studies to improve the
quality and delivery of care).
168. Id. (stating top hospitals are considered the most efficient and well managed facilities

in the country).
169. HCIA-SACHS INSTITUTE, supra note 167, at 4 (citing RICHARD F. AVERILL, 3M
HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS, ALL PATIENT REFINED DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS
DEFINITIONS MANUAL, VERSION 15.0. (1998)).
170. Id. at 5 (stating less than half of all cases fell in the baseline severity level for the

following conditons: drug withdrawal syndrome, endocarditis, bacterial meningitis, burn (major),
neonatal sepsis, gastrointestinal bleed, sepsis (strep pneumonia)).
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complicated conditions that require further care. Because
M&R assumes that sophisticated home health care is
available, it is also important that clinicians be able to
provide inpatient care when such services are
unavailable. '
As Dr. Cleary observed, "These guidelines are merely a mechanism
for insurance companies to avoid their responsibilities and to shift the cost
of care from themselves to kids' families. The guidelines quite literally
appear to have been made Up.""7

Results of the 100 Top Hospital study showed that lengths of stay for
60% of uncomplicated cases exceeded the M&R GLOS. For twenty-three
of the thirty-six conditions in this study, more than 50% of the
uncomplicated cases had LOS exceeding M&R recommendations.
Interestingly, the top hospitals applied LOS shorter or equivalent to nonwinner hospitals for almost all of the conditions included in the study."13 A
M&R spokesman questioned the studies' credibility by emphasizing that
they were conducted by a competing consulting medical firm.'7 But
another recent investigation found that the LOS in New York State in 1995
for sixteen pediatric conditions also exceeded .those of M&R. (No
adjustments, however, were made for severity of condition.) The authors
warn of the "potential effects of such guidelines on both patients and the
hospitals caring for them. While endorsing the need for cost-effective
practice, we call attention to the methods used to develop and validate
7
guidelines. "'

D. Conclusion
Courts have increasingly recognized that managed care companies
make medical decisions. 76

By subjecting the attending physicians'

171. Id. at 7.
172. Linda 0. Prager, PediatricHospital Stay Goals Questioned, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct.
9, 2000, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pickOO/prl21016.htm.
173. HCIA-SACHS INSTITUTE, 100 ToP HOSPITALS PEDIATRIC LOS COMPARISON WITH
NON-WINNERS AND MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON GUIDELINES 7, 8 (2000).
174. Ron Nissimov,
CHRON., Sept. 15, 2000.

Studies:

Children Shortchanged by Hospital Guidelines, HouS.

175. MARION S. SILLS ET AL., Pediatric Milliman and Robertson Length-of-Stay Criteria:
Are They Realistic? 105(4) PEDIATRICS 733 (Apr. 2000).
176. Snow v. Burden, M.D., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932 (E.D. Pa. May 1999) (delaying

authorization by MCO for diagnostic procedures was substandard medical care); Plocica v.
Nylcare of Texas, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 658 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Moscovitch v. Danbury Hosp., 25
F. Supp. 2d 74 (U.S Dist. Conn. Oct. 1998) (in both cases, the appropriateness of the medical
and psychiatric care decisions of the MCOs were successfully challenged); Blaine v. Community
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treatment recommendations to medical necessity determinations according
to corporate criteria, often based on commercial guidelines deviating from
the prevailing standard of care, MCOs substitute their medical judgment
for that of the attending physicians. Frequently, such medical necessity
evaluations, judging the appropriateness of the treating physician's
diagnosis and proposed treatment plan, are made by individuals without the
required experience, medical training and knowledge of patient's individual
circumstances.'77 This practice has been rejected by the American Medical
Association, which insists that clinical judgment be left to properly
qualified licensed physicians with adequate patient contact, and be in
agreement with the applicable standard of care and the prevailing medical
opinion. 178 The organization further considered utilization review programs
that "involve the gathering of symptoms from a patient and communication
of a diagnosis to the patient" (such as on-site concurrent review by nurses)
as having many of the characteristics of the practice of medicine.
Physicians themselves have protested the "undue interference in their
practice of medicine" by MCO medical management staff without proper
Health Plan, 687 N.Y.S.2d 854 (N.Y. 1998) (stating that decision by MCO to have patient seen
by a nurse instead of a physician for diagnosis and treatment represented a unilateral
determination of medical treatment); Nascimento v. Harvard Community Health Care Plan, Inc.
et al., 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 166 (Mass. 1997) (stating MCO denial of autologous bone
marrow transplant in spite of contractual promise to provide all medically necessary care was
medical malpractice); Roessert v. Health Net et al, 929 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating
the MCO's decision to commit plaintiff to a mental institution was a medical decision).
177. Affidavit of Patrick F. Vetere, supra note 119, at 3. See also Batas v. The Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y. App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001), motion grantedby Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (attending physician, Dr. Vetere, for plaintiffs Batas and Vogel, stated in
his affidavit that a Prudential Concurrent Review Nurse called his office two days after Ms.
Vogel's surgery and "informed us that there was no medical reason (emphasis added) to keep the
patient hospitalized, stating that Prudential would not cover any further expenses arising from the
patient's hospitalization."
The physician instructed his staff to inform the nurse that he
"adamantly disagreed with her medical opinion" and would refuse to discharge Ms. Vogel.
In her trial testimony, Dr. Linda Peeno explained that a Humana case manager nurse has
the authority to tell a board certified pediatric neurologist what to do. "That's exactly what a
health plan does . . .and that is part of the difference between managed care and traditional
insurance that now the plan holds itself out as doing that, and that's one of the requirements that
they have to meet in order to be accredited." Record at 1902, 1903, in Chipps v. Humana Health
Ins. Co. of Fla., (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, Fla.) (Case No. CL 96-00423 AE)
(unreported, filed 1996). See also supra note 69.
178. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Medical Association and The Medical Society of
the State of New York at 2 (March 30, 2000), Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., (N.Y.
App. Div., Dept. 1, Index No. 97-107881, IAS Part 49) (filed 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
by Batas v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), motion
granted by Batas v. The PrudentialIns. Co. of Am, 721 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
[hereinafter Amicus Cfriae Brief of the American Medical Association].
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qualifications or by medical management department physicians not
specialized in their respective areas.'7 9 Furthermore, long delays in
obtaining approval for medical procedures are common. In cases of
denial, the appeals process for what is considered essential treatment can
be even more time-consuming. As a consequence, patients' conditions
have deterioratea irreversibly and some have died.,8o Even though delays
and denials are generally classified as "administrative" in nature, they
often have medical consequences and thus represent de facto medical
decisions not to treat.
1. Guidelines
Cost containment in health care and the standardization of medical
practice for quality control are generally not disputed in today's health care
delivery environment. Because of the extensive use of guidelines for such
purposes, guideline validity is essential. Guidelines developed by medical
specialty societies according to scientific and evidence-based criteria,
reflective of prevailing practices, and in agreement with Institute of
Medicine and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality standards,
would most likely meet with little resistance on the part of practitioners.
Commercial guidelines, however, derived from data considered
"proprietary" and judged by physicians as endangering patients and in
violation of the standard of care, are rejected as "straightjackets" and
"cookbook medicine." Furthermore, the perceived economic motives for
such guideline development and their indiscriminate use by MCOs
undermine the guidelines' credibility with the medical community."'
Physicians have also expressed concern about practice guidelines
stretching the definition of primary care beyond what practitioners should
responsibly perform in their offices. According to the M&R guidelines,
large, potentially malignant facial lesions can be removed by general
practitioners,' 82 avoiding a referral to a plastic surgeon. Furthermore, as
reported by the director of an emergency room, MCOs have recently
179. MARK GREEN, WHAT AILS HMOS-A CONSUMER DIAGNOSIS AND Rx, 63 (1996) (a
report by the Public Advocate for the City of New York).
180. Crum v. Health Alliance Mid-West, Inc. 47 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (stating
that triage hotline nurse denied patient's admission to emergency care resulting in cardiac arrest);
Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), reh'g denied (Feb. 12, 1999) (stating that patient

became paraplegic because of delayed admission to the appropriate neurological facility).
181. Myerson, supra note 44, at Cl (stating that Dr. Doyle, chief author of the M&R
guidelines, has stressed that the guidelines are goals not rules but that "the more rigorous the
application, the greater the savings").
182. MARK GREEN, supra note 179, at 64 (quoting Pushing the Definition of Primary Care
to the Limit, MED. ECONOMICS, Aug. 7, 1995, at 60).
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instructed patients to see their primary care provider instead of visiting an
ER. "I find this worrisome, many PCPs have little suturing experience
and wouldn't know one tendon from another."' 83 The M&R hospitalization
length-of-stay guidelines were called unrealistically optimistic by the AMA
because treatment and recovery often do involve considerable
complications since patients do not respond optimally, as the guidelines
assume.'84 Even though M&R points out that physicians should use their
own judgment, doctors are "worn down by constant bickering with
insurance companies that use guidelines such as M&R. A clerk with no
knowledge of medicine is often the one telling the doctor what the
recommended treatment is, and doctors have no idea the guidelines were
written by an actuarial firm."' 85
2. Cost Containment
MCOs, physicians' offices and hospitals require an elaborate
administrative infrastructure for the preauthorization and concurrent review
of individual medical decisions. Disputes with providers over delays and
denials, frequent arguments over payment for tests or necessary
equipment, and excessive paperwork'86 absorb additional resources.
Hospitals may dedicate entire office suites to on-site personnel conducting
concurrent review for numerous MCOs. Managed care companies may
have eighteen nurses on staff for treatment reviews, a full-time medical
director, twenty-seven customer service representatives, and four part-time
medical directors. On the business side, there may be eight representatives
to recruit providers, fifteen salespeople to sell to employers, and roughly
one-hundred clerical workers for claims processing. 8' In addition, major
data processing centers are required for the wealth of medical and business
information generated by a large MCO. Humana, for example, has fourhundred in-house application programmers for the development and
maintenance of its own application systems. "The information systems
support marketing, sales, underwriting, contract administration, billing,
financial . . . customer service, authorization and referral management,

183. Id.
184. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Medical Association, supra note 178, at 9.
185. Cost-Cutting Guide Used by HMOs Called "Dangerous,"supra note 152.

186. MARK GREEN, supra note 179, at 63.
187. Id. at 81 (stating that this was the infrastructure of an HMO with 110,000 members in
New Jersey).
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concurrent review, physician capitation and claims administration, provider
management, quality management and utilization review.", 88
Whether the immense administrative apparatus for controlling and
"standardizing" the micro-allocation of health care funds through managed
care treatment decisions at the bedside absorbs whatever "efficiencies"
may have been achieved, often at the patients' expense, remains
unanswered.'89 With health care expenditures stabilized on a macro level,
the traditional providers' hands-on clinical judgment might be just as
"efficient" while much more patient-friendly.19

188. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.
Attachment 1, Section 1, in Price et al. v. Humana Inc., (S.D. Fla.) (Case No. 9:99-8763 CIVMoreno) (unreported, filed 1999), transferred and consolidated In re Humana Inc. Managed
Care Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099 (2000), aff'd 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS (1lth Cir. 2002).
(stating that Humana's centralized management services include "management information
systems, product administration, financing, personnel, development, accounting, legal advice,
public relations, marketing, insurance, purchasing, risk management, actuarial, underwriting and
claims processing").
189. MCOs on the average spend close to 30% of every premium dollar on administration.
Administrative expenditures by German sickness funds do not exceed 6% even though recent
health care reforms are pushing costs upward.
190. See, e.g., Dave Barry, Wit's End, Managed Care, THE WASH. POST MAGAZINE, Oct.
15, 2000, at 36 (stating that the complex, bureaucratic administration of MCOs is certainly
perceived by the public and solutions are proposed. "All we have to do is get in a time machine
and go back to 1957. In those days we had a great health care system. The way it worked was,
every family had a doctor, who wore a white coat and a head reflector, and who had an aquarium
in his waiting room ...In those days, medical paperwork was simple: The doctor gave you a
bill. That was it. Whereas today, if you get involved with the medical care system in any way,
including sending flowers to a hospital patient, you will spend the rest of your life wading
through baffling statements from insurance companies. I speak with authority. At some point in
the past, some member of my family apparently received medical care, and now every day, rain
or shine, my employer's insurance company sends me at least one letter, comically entitled
"EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS," which looks like it was created by the Internal Revenue
Service From Hell.
It's covered with numbers indicating my. in-network, out-of-pocket
deductible; my out-of-network, nondeductible pocketable; my semi-pocketed, nonworkable,
indestructible Donald Duckable, etc. For all I know, somewhere in all these numbers is a charge
for Dr. Cohn's fish food. What am I supposed to do with this information? ...Let's demand
some action! Let's track down the people sending out these EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS
letters and have them arrested! Let's bring back head reflectors!"); Carey Goldberg, State
Referendums Seeking to Overhaul Health Care System, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at Al
(stating that it may come as no surprise that states such as Maryland, Massachusetts, and Oregon
are gearing up for referendums on the introduction of universal health care systems); Gina
Kolata, For Those Who Can Afford It, Old-Style Medicine Returns, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, at
Al (stating that at the same time, increasing numbers of physicians accept self-paying patients
only, adding another tier to the already multi-tiered American health care system).
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GERMANY: ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING

A. Introduction to the German Statutory Health Care System 91
The German health care system is an all-payer, pre-paid, non-profit,
universal access/universal coverage system of social health insurance
which is currently embodied in Title Five of the Social Code (SGB V) of
1988.192
It originated at the beginning of the 19th century when
tradesmen's guilds and industrialists began to introduce health care
coverage for the protection of their members and workers. In 1883, under
Chancellor Bismarck, the National Health Insurance Act was adopted
which integrated all individual plans into a single national social insurance
plan. The administrative structure which had grown out of seven
categories of corporate sickness funds and sickness funds by profession
was preserved and continues to be one of the foundations of the SGB V.111
Within these categories, a total of over 500 plans offering by law almost
identical comprehensive coverage is available. Originally, members were
required to obtain coverage for life under their professional plans. In
1996, open enrollment was introduced as an element of competition among
the different plans.
Premiums are assessed at a uniform percentage (13.8% in 2000)premiums are split evenly between employers and members-up to a
certain level of annual income (currently approximately $40,000). This
represents an element of income redistribution since half of the premium is
spent on a member's health care, the remaining half on family members
(covered at no additional charge, independent of their number) and on the
elderly. The unemployed and the elderly continue to receive the same
comprehensive benefits without paying premiums. Care is therefore
provided according to need, not according to income. Those whose
incomes exceed the legal maximum may opt out of the statutory plan. But
191. See Ursula Weide, A Comparison of American and German Cost Containment in
Health Care: Tort Liability of U.S. Managed Care Organizations vs. German Health Care
Reform Legislation, 13 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L. FOR. 47 (1998); Ursula Weide, Health Care
Reform and the Changing Standard of Care in the United States and Germany, 20(3) N.Y. L.
SCH. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 249 (2000).
192. SOZIALGESETZBUCH - FONFrES BUCH, SGB V. BGBL. S., 2477 Bonn. 20 Dezember
1988; [SOCIAL CODE, TITLE V, published in the GERMAN CODE 2477 (Dec. 20, 1988)]
[hereinafter SGB V].
193. Krankenkassen Betriebskassen (individual corporate plans) Innungskassen (plans by
trade). Landwirtschaftliche Krankenkasse (agricultural workers plan).
See-Krankenkasse
(merchant marine plan). Bundesknappschaft (mine workers plan). Ortskassen (local funds by
municipality or county). Certain groups of blue and white collar workers also could choose one
of the so-called substitute funds (Ersatzkassen)instead.
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90% of all Germans remain covered as private coverage by law must
correspond at a minimum to statutory coverage, creating little incentive to
engage in private insurance contracting. Furthermore, most universal
system members have private secondary insurance covering additional
benefits such as private instead of semi-private hospital rooms. Ninety
percent of all physicians are public plan providers but may also deliver
care under private indemnity insurance.
While the government sets the overall legal framework for the health
care system and its administration (the SGB V has been amended numerous
times since its adoption in 1988 when it replaced the venerable Insurance
Code of 1914,'9 also amended and fine-tuned over time), the delivery of
care is subject to joint physician and sickness fund self-governance by
associations. The principle of self-govemance was officially announced by
Bismarck in the "Imperial Message" on November 11, 1881, read during
an opening session of the National Parliament, and announcing the
introduction of the Social Insurances Act. The delegation of power to
associations was intended to achieve "a greater closeness to the real forces
of the citizens' lives by concentrating those forces within corporate entities
protected and supported by the State, permitting the resolution of tasks
which the State would be unable to accomplish to the same extent."'' 9 In
1972, the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic rephrased in
modern language the stated purpose of the delegation of rulemaking
authority to associations, now corporate entities under public law.
Subgroups of society should be allowed to regulate their own affairs based
on their special expertise and knowledge of local particularities, often
difficult to discern for the legislator, thus reducing the distance between
those who adopt norms and those bound by them, and permitting more
rapid adjustment to change. 19
Sickness funds are self-governed corporate entities under public law, 97
and deliver health care in cooperation with the providers (physicians,
194. This Act contained several titles covering health insurance, workers' compensation and
retirement benefits. A separate act for health insurance was adopted in 1988, the SGB V.
195. INGWER EBSEN, AUTONOME RECHTSSSETZUNG IN DER SOZIALVERSICHERUNG
[AUTONOMOUS RULEMAKING IN SOCIAL INSURANCES], VSSR 57 (1990) (quoting Kaiserliche
Botschaft, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 5. Legislaturperiode, Erste Session 1881, Bd. 1, S. I
ff [Deliberations of the National Parliament, Fifth Term, First Session 1881, Vol. 1, at 1]).
Associations as the expression of society's communitarian spirit have been analyzed at length by
German jurisprudists. See, e.g., OTro VON GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT
[THE GERMAN LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS] (1887). In opposition to the economic liberalism of
Kant, von Gierke's approach was labeled "economic communitarianism."
196. BverfGE 33, 125, 156.
197. K6rperschaften des offentlichen Rechts, Art. 4, SGB V. Self-governance and status as
corporate entities under public law are particularities of the delegation of rulemaking authority
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dentists, psychologists, hospitals and pharmacists).
These operate as
independent businesses but are subject to regulation.191 Both sickness funds
and physicians are represented by regional associations (plan physician
membership is mandatory)'1 with elected assemblies and boards. All
associations are corporate entities under public law. While there are
several federal sickness fund associations representing the different fund
categories, there is only one Federal Physician Association.2 The federal
associations of both parties to the system of self-governance annually
renegotiate a collective national agreement2°' stipulating the framework for
the provision of care and provider compensation. This agreement includes
a fee scale based on relative value units for fee-for-service payments, and
capitation for certain basic services. It also lists quality control guidelines
in agreement with SGB V, Art. 135, for specialized diagnostic and
treatment procedures such as MRI, dialysis, radiology and nuclear
medicine, pace makers, ultrasounds, and the cytological diagnosis of
female reproductive carcinomas.
It further integrates the coverage
guidelines as adopted by the Joint Federal Committees of the Sickness
Funds and Physician Associations under SGB V, Art. 92.
These
guidelines are intended to guarantee a high standard of care, not to limit
benefits. So far, nineteen guidelines apply, most prominent among them
the pregnancy care guideline, the early childhood screening guideline, the
prescription drug guideline, and the guideline for the evaluation of
diagnostic and treatment procedures for coverage purposes.Regional agreements, incorporating all elements of the national
agreement but allowing for regional adjustments, are concluded among the
regional physician and sickness fund associations.
The regional
agreements emphasize provider compensation, random plausibility checks
under the German system of government. Other entities enjoying this status are municipalities
and counties, universities, chambers of industry and trade, public radio and television. All may
autonomously promulgate charters for the regulation of their affairs, and no enabling legislation
is required.
HARTMUT MAURER,
ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT [GENERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 64 (12th ed. 1999).
198. The German health care delivery system does not employ anyone and in that sense is
not a "national health system" as found in Great Britain and Canada.

199. Landesverbandeder Krankenkassen; Kassendrztliche Vereinigungen.
200. Spitzenverbande der Krankenkassen; KassenarztlicheBundesvereinigung (KBV).
201. Bundesmantelvertrag, reprinted in
VERTRAGE
DER
KASSENRZTLICHEN
BUNDESVEREINIGUNG (DIENSTAUFLAGE DER KBV) [CONTRACTS OF THE FEDERAL PHYSICIAN
ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL EDITION] (1998).
202. Respectively, Mutterschaftsrichtlinie (for pregnancy); Kinderrichtlinie (for early
childhood screening); Arzneimittelrichtlinie (for prescription drugs); and Bewertung von
Untersuchungs und Behandlungsmethoden (for diagnostic and treatment procedures). The latter
guideline is applied in conjunction with the stipulations of Art. 135, SGB V.
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on claims filed, and the retrospective economic review of care delivered
by office, based on medical specialty. On a quarterly basis, physicians bill
their associations which process and pay the claims with assets received
from the sickness funds. Sickness fund revenues correspond to the
premiums paid by their members. Members are not invoiced except for
copayments and some dental indemnity claims.
B. Coverage, Benefits and Medical Necessity
Historically, the German health care code guaranteed the coverage of
members203 but did not yet bind sickness funds and providers. Due to poor
economic conditions in the 1930s, a comprehensive system of contracts
between these two parties and their associations was added to the code to
safeguard the health care delivery system.2 Today, the Coverage (Art. 1
to 66) and Health Care Delivery sections (Art. 69 to 140) are found in
Chapters Three and Four of the SGB V.-05 Coverage is comprehensive and

identical for all members, and physicians and sickness funds together must
ensure the delivery of care. Under SGB V, Art. 11, coverage is to be
provided:
for the prevention, early diagnosis, treatment and
stabilization of illness; contraception, elective sterilization,
and legal abortions.- Included are medical and adjunct
services for rehabilitation to prevent disability or illness
requiring longterm care, and services to reverse, improve
or stabilize such conditions. In case of hospitalization,
coverage extends to the presence of a patient's companion
whenever medically necessary.
Art. 27 specifies:
Members are entitled to benefits for the diagnosis,
treatment and stabilization of an illness or to control its
symptoms.
Coverage includes medical and dental
treatment, psychotherapy, drugs, durable medical
equipment, medical/surgical dressings and supplies,
adjunct therapies, home care and household help,
203. Leistungsrecht.
204. Leistungserbringungsrecht.
205. The extent of future coverage may depend on the priority BSG-Bundessozialgericht,

the Supreme Social Court-jurisprudence may accord to one or the other Chapter. For further
discussion, see infra.
206. Abortions are reimbursed whenever "medically and socially" indicated.

amendment extended coverage to medication-induced abortions.

A recent
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medical and other services for
hospitalization,
rehabilitation, stress testing and occupational therapy. The
needs of mental health patients must receive particular
attention, including adjunct therapies and rehabilitation.
Fertility treatment

. . .

is covered. w

Several SGB V sections define what would correspond to the medical
necessity definition in managed care plan documents:
* The quality and efficacy of the benefits to be provided by the
sickness funds must correspond to the prevailing medical standard of
care and be in accordance with the progress of medical science. (Art.
2)
* Contracts between physician and sickness fund associations must
ensure the sufficient, appropriate and cost-effective °8 delivery of
207. United States. General Accounting Office, 1993 German Health Reforms New Coast
Control Initiatives: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. SENATE,
GAO/HRD 93-103, at 25. (stating the German health care system is one of the "most
comprehensive health insurance benefits programs in the world").
208. KARL HAUCK, SGB V: GESETZLICHE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG, KOMMENTAR [SGB

V ANNOTATED], K § 12, at 7, 8 (Sept. 1999) (stating that cost-effectiveness expresses the
fiduciary function of the State and applies to all levels of German government: federal, state and
local. Cost-effectiveness under social law, as related to health care for individual members, is of
relevance only when several equally effective but more or less costly treatments are available.
Cost is (basically) irrelevant when a single procedure would produce the desired outcome. (Art.
1, SGB V, entitles members to the preservation, restoration or improvement of their health.)
Benefits are cost-effective when the desired outcome can be achieved with an acceptable
minimum of resources. "Such a cost-benefit analysis, however, is not purely economic.
Qualitative medical considerations, especially the kind, duration and sustainability of the
outcome, must be balanced with cost. How to quantify quality is the underlying issue,
unresolved under current law, perhaps defying any kind of resolution. In a prepaid system of
health care, only increasing standardization may provide a satisfactory answer.") Hauck's looseleaf edition is continuously updated, reflecting all amendments to the code.
According to Art. 103, SGB V, cost-effectiveness reviews of physicians' practices are
conducted by both physician and sickness fund associations, based on economic utilization
criteria, determined by the various and changing cost containment approaches adopted by the
government. Examples are sector budgets (for all of ambulatory vs. in-patient care), prescription
drug budgets, and practice budgets by specialty. Penalties for violations generally are of a
collective nature and, even though stipulated by the SGB V, have not been enforced in any
consistent fashion. Art. 116, SGB V, provides for (economic utilization) cost-effectiveness
review of hospitals to be conducted by the sickness fund associations. This application of the
social law concept of cost-effectiveness has been criticized for ignoring costs incurred in cases of
undertreatment requiring more expensive care later on. "In this respect, the term costeffectiveness in social law is one-eyed: it is unrelated to general economic cost-effectiveness. It
has become a singular concept resistant to abstract definition and can be understood only within
Clemens,
Abrechnungsstreitigkeiten,
Thomas
V
framework. "
the
SGB
Wirtschaftlichkeitsprifung, Schadensregrefl [Claims Processing Disputes, Cost-Effectiveness
Audits,

Sanctions],

in

HANDBUCH

DES

SOZIALVERSICHERUNGS-RECHTS,

BAND

1,
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medical care for all insureds under the plan, in accordance with the
law and the coverage guidelines established by the Joint Federal
Committees (JFC) 2° , and correspond to the generally recognized level
of medical expertise.(Art. 72)210
* Sickness funds and providers must ensure care for all members as
needed, in a consistent fashion, and in accordance with the generally
recognized level of medical expertise. The delivery of care must be
sufficient and appropriate, it may not exceed whatever is necessary, it
must correspond to the professionally required level of quality, and
must be cost-effective. (Art. 70)
The BSG (Bundessozialgericht, Supreme Social Court) considers Art.
27 to represent a general guarantee of coverage but no entitlement to
individual benefits .21 Due to the complexity of medical care, additional
decisions must follow to establish the eligibility for benefits. First, a plan
physician, authorized under public law to determine "eligibility" must
suspect or find illness in accordance with Art. 27, defined as an
"exceptional physical or mental condition necessitating treatment." 2 2
(Benefits for prevention and early screening are guaranteed under Arts.
11, 20 to 26). Once this requirement of the SGB V Coverage Chapter has
been satisfied, the patient is eligible for benefits necessary for the
diagnosis, cure or stabilization of an illness, or to control its symptoms.
Individual treatment decisions are delegated to the attending physician who
provides or orders the services required to translate the general material
claim to coverage into individual benefits.2 '3 These must correspond to the
prevailing standard of care and reflect the progress of medical science.
(Art. 2) The delivery of care must be sufficient, appropriate and costeffective, not exceeding what is necessary for the individual circumstances
of the patient. (Arts. 70, 72) Benefits, however, may also be specified by
coverage guidelines issued by the Joint Federal Committee under the SGB
V Health Care Delivery Chapter (Arts. 92, 135). These guidelines are
considered general and abstract criteria, to be translated into specific

KRANKENVERSICHERUNGSRECHT [HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL INSURANCE LAW, VOL. 1, HEALTH

INSURANCE LAW] 918 (Bertram Schulin, ed., 1994).
209. Bundesausschiisse der ,rzte und Krankenkassen. For further discussion, see infra.
210. This article stipulates the joint contractual provider-sickness fund mandate to assure
access to and the provision of medical care for all insureds. Sicherstellungsauftrag.
211. BSG 4 Rk 5/92, E 73, 271, 277, 290 (Dec. 12, 1993).
212. HAUCK, supra note 208, K § 27, at 4 (50th addition to the Annotated Code, July
2000).
213. BSGE 73, 271, 279; BSG SozR 3-2500 §30 No. 8, at 32.
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and hospital

C. The Joint Federal Committee
The institutions of the German universal system of health care have
remained remarkably stable in spite of several successive systems of
government. 21 The earliest embodiment of the Joint Federal Committees
was the then-called Central Committee, established by the Berlin
Agreement of 1913 as a response to a long period of conflict between
sickness funds and physicians. After a series of physician strikes, the
Berlin Agreement for the first time established a joint sickness fundunder neutral
physician committee with equal representation,
chairmanship, with the participation of neutral members, and a mandatory
arbitration procedure. The private Hartmann Bund (roughly comparable to
the American Medical Association) had been founded in 1900 to strengthen
the physicians' position vis-A-vis the sickness funds which contracted
individually with providers, thus creating total dependency. The Hartmann
Bund had demanded patients' independent choice of physicians and any
willing provider contracting with licensed physicians only. The joint
Central Committee's initial mandate was to improve the representation of
physicians' interests but also to protect the people from a collapse of the
health care system. In 1923, after the expiration of the voluntary Berlin
Agreement, many of its clauses were integrated into the National Social
Insurances Act (RVO) 26 by the National Ministry of Labor.1 7
The Central Committee, now safely anchored in public law, evolved
into the National Committee mandated to further develop the mechanisms
embodied in the original Berlin Agreement. The Committee subsequently
received rulemaking authority and refined the law regulating the relations
214. Robert Francke, Richtlinien, Normsetzungsvertrageund neue Behandlungsmethoden im
Rechtskonkretisierungskonzept des Bundessozialgerichts [Coverage Guidelines, Norm Contracts
and Innovative Procedures as Interpreted in Rulings of the Supreme Social Court], 1 DIE
SOZIALGERICHTSBARKEIT 5 (Jan. 1999) (citing BSGE 73, 271, 280 and BSG SozR 3-2500 §39
No. 3).
215. This section is based on Marian Dohler and Philip Manow-Borgwardt, Kontinuitat
durch Wandel: Zur Institutionsgeschichte des Bundesausschusses der Arzte und Krankenkassen
[Continuity Through Change: The Institutional History of the Federal Committee of Physicians
and Sickness Funds], in GESUNDHEITSRISIKEN, INDUSTRIEGESELLSCHAFT UND SOZIALE
SICHERUNGEN IN DER GESCHICHTE [HEALTH RISKS, THE INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETY, AND
SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS IN HISTORY] 119 (Dietrich Milles, ed., 1993).
216. Reichsversicherungsordnung. This act was adopted in 1914 and covered health

insurance, workers' compensation and retirement benefits.
217. Historically, oversight over health care has alternated between the Ministry of Labor

and the Ministry of Health.

560 ILSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 8:507
between physicians and sickness funds. This included the adoption of
licensing procedures for physicians and the first coverage guidelines for the
"cost-effective" dispensation of drugs and "electro-physical treatments" in
1925. The Hartmann Bund, willing at times to break the law to represent
physicians' interests and accused by the government of practicing
"terrorism," was now cooperating with the National Committee. Years of
such cooperation between physicians and sickness funds pursuing common
goals had already resulted in a much improved relationship between the
parties. The National Ministry of Labor supported the development of
sickness fund and physician associations and recognized their national
federations as the "legal representatives of the parties' interests" in the
RVO.
In 1931, the physician associations received their status as
corporate entities under public law. The government had "domesticated
unruly" private law associations by recognizing the importance of their
contribution.
In spite of the normative authority of the National Committee, the
definition of its legal relationship with the state remained amorphous-the
Committee was at times designated as an "entity of the system of selfgovernance under agency oversight" or as a "national agency with
elements of self-governance. "2'8 The legal status of its guidelines,
including the adoption of rules for the medical licensing boards, was
equally contested but a consensus developed eventually, according the
guidelines de facto normative status but not the force of law.
In 1931, in the middle of the international economic crisis, the
National Ministry of Labor issued an RVO emergency regulation defining
the relationship between sickness funds and physicians in accordance with
Committee guidelines, the logical next step in the continued development
of the cooperation between sickness funds and physicians. The social
health insurance code thus incorporated licensing rules, patient choice of
providers, capitated payments (adopted with the physicians' approval),
collective agreements, and the equal representation of sickness funds and
physicians on administrative entities under public law. As a consequence
of the adoption of the licensing regulations, physicians now had a public
law entitlement to a contract to practice, the first step towards extending
The emergency regulation also
the RVO to individual physicians.
provided the National Committee with de jure authority to promulgate
binding rules under the act, a delegation of rulemaking authority unique
among all social insurance laws. Government regulatory authority was
preserved under default provisions. This democratic process collapsed,
however, when the physicians refused to participate in Committee activities
218. Marian D6hler and Philip Manow-Borgwardt, supra note 215, at 125.
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under the Nazi regime, and regulation reverted back to the National
Ministry of Health by default. 9
After World War II, the influential pre-war role of the now-called
Joint Federal Committee was not restored. Only when coverage was
expanded in the sixties, the JFC adopted the pregnancy care guideline, the
children's guideline and the rehabilitation guideline. The focus then was
on ensuring a high standard of care, and the guidelines served the detailed
interpretation of the health care code. But beginning in 1977, when the
first health care cost containment provision was passed, the entities of the
system of self-governance began to be instrumentalized for costThe JFC was now charged with the
effectiveness purposes.
implementation of several cost control mechanisms, such as the
development of a list of medications for minor ailments (common cold,
headaches) to be excluded from coverage, and of the guideline for the costeffective use of major medical equipment. Over time, the Committee thus
has assumed different roles: initially, it served the collective interpretation
and implementation of the first agreements between sickness funds and
physicians, evolved into the regulatory entity of the system of selfgovernance, further refining the contractual relationship between the
parties, then issued guidelines to uphold a high standard of care, and in
recent years has increasingly provided assistance with cost containment.
D. Coverage Rulemaking under SGB V, Arts. 92, 135, and 137
Today, the Joint Federal Committee,2 as established by SGB V, Art.
91, and mandated to issue coverage guidelines under Art. 92, has a total of
twenty-one members: a neutral chairperson, two neutral members, nine
members representing physicians (and dentists or psychologists), three
representatives of the Local Funds, two of the Substitute Funds, and one
member each representing the corporate-sponsored plans, the plans by
trade, and the agricultural workers, merchant marine, and mine workers
plans. Should the parties be unable to agree on the neutral chairperson and
the two neutral members, these are appointed by the Federal Secretary of
Health in cooperation with the Federal Physician Association and all
sickness fund associations. Each member has five deputies of which no
more than two may participate in meetings. Whenever psychotherapy
guidelines are to be drafted, the nine physician members are replaced by

219. Id. at 127.

220. Even though the singular is generally used, there are three JFCs covering medicine,
dentistry and psychology.
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five psychologists and five physicians practicing psychotherapy.'
Members may not receive instructions from their associations. Proposed
coverage decisions are referred to JFC working groups with generally nine
members each, representing the physician and sickness fund associations.
Decisions are submitted to the plenary and must be adopted by majority
vote. JFC membership is uncompensated, only travel expenses and time
spent working on JFC-related activities are reimbursed.
The Federal Ministry of Health has oversight over the JFC but is
concerned only with the proper implementation of procedures, not the
actual decision making. Coverage guidelines adopted by the JFC must be
submitted to the Ministry which may object within two months to matters
The
Objections may not reflect political considerations.
of law.
Committee may cure objections within the time frame set by the Ministry,
if it fails to do so, the Ministry may promulgate its own guideline. The
JFC may then bring an action before the social courts. So far, however,
the Committee has resolved all issues in a timely fashion, avoiding further
action by the Ministry. 22
1. Committee Activities
Since the adoption of the SGB V in 1988, the JFC's task has been the
development of coverage guidelines23 under Art. 92 as necessary to ensure
the "sufficient, appropriate and cost-effective" delivery of outpatient health
care. (The JFC for dentists issues guidelines limited to dental procedures,
Art. 92 mirrors the coverage
dental prosthetics, and orthodontics.)
members are entitled to under Art. 27 and may be expanded (the original
act of 1988 did not include items 10 and 11):
The Federal Committees adopt guidelines as necessary for
the delivery of health care in order to ensure sufficient,
adequate and cost-effective services for the insureds; the
221. Psychologists fought for many years to be recognized and reimbursed as independent
providers since reimbursement was allowed only after referral from and while under supervision
by a physician. With equal representation of psychologists and physicians on the JFC for matters
psychological, physicians are still able to block psychologists' decisions.
222. Karl Jung, Leitlinien aus der Sicht des Bundesausschusses der Arzte und
Krankenkassen-Rechtspolitische and rechtspraktische Probleme [Clinical Practice Guidelines
Viewed by the Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds-Problems of Law,
Application and Policy], in ARZTLICHE LEITLINIEN: EMPIRIE UND RECHT PROFESSIONELLER
NORMSETZUNG [MEDICAL GUIDELINES: EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR SETrING
PROFESSIONAL NORMS] (Dieter Hart, ed., 2000) [hereinafter Clinical Practice Guidelines

Viewed by the Federal Committee].
223. Coverage guidelines are defined as "norms addressing acts or omissions, issued by a
rulemaking entity as mandated by the SGB V."
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needs of mental health patients must receive particular
attention . . . Guidelines must be adopted in particular-2
[emphasis added] for:
1. medical treatment
2. dental treatment including dentures and orthodontics
3. the early diagnosis of illness
4. pregnancy and maternal care
5. the coverage of innovative2 diagnostic and treatment
procedures
6. the prescription of drugs, medical/surgical dressings
and supplies, medial equipment, prosthetic devices, adjunct
therapies, hospitalization, home care and socio-therapy
7. disability determination
8. the provision of medical care as required by individual
circumstances, and of medical, occupational and
complementary rehabilitation benefits
10. the determination of number of physicians required
for adequate health care delivery
11. medical services in cases of infertility
12. contraception and legal abortions.
Examples of current guidelines (nineteen have been adopted so far)
are the pregnancy care guideline (dating back to 1965), the early childhood
screening guideline, and guidelines for prescription drugs (originating in
the 19th century), early cancer screening, disability determination,
psychotherapy and fertility treatment. Their main purpose is to guarantee
the standard of care. The pregnancy care guideline is as detailed as a
224. This term indicates that the above list is not exclusive. Ein Verwaltungstiger erhilt
Zihne [An Administrative Tiger Gets Its Teeth], 23 DER KASSENARZT 31 (1997).

225. The German term is "new" procedures. The author, however, prefers to use
"innovative" because the issue concerns some of the same diagnostic and treatment services
dubbed "experimental" by managed care companies.
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clinical practice guideline (CPG) and sets a high standard for medical
services during pregnancy. Practitioners must apply the guideline and may
not undertreat. The early childhood screening guideline also has elements
of a CPG.
Art. 135, in conjunction with Art. 92(1)(5), further clarifies the
mandate for innovative treatment coverage determinations, introducing
specific evidence-based requirements. When the NOG 222 became law on
July 1, 1997, Art. 135 was significantly expanded:
Innovative medical and dental diagnostic and therapeutic
procedures are covered by the sickness funds only if the
Joint Federal Committee has issued guidelines under Art.
92(1)(5) recommending the acceptance of the diagnostic
and therapeutic usefulness of the new procedure, its
medical necessity and cost-effectiveness-also
in
comparison with already covered benefits-in agreement
with the current state of scientific knowledge of the
specialty concerned.
The JFC's scope of action now included the examination of the
sufficiency, appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of innovative diagnostic
and therapeutic procedures as compared to already covered benefits, in
accordance with each medical specialty's state of the art. (Concerns were
raised at the time that the application of internal specialty standards would
lead to automatic "self-validation" but the JFC chairman, in agreement
with members of the health care committee, clarified that this phrase
expressed a requirement for comment by experts in the respective
fields. 217) Applications for such coverage determinations must be submitted

by a regional physician association, the Federal Physician Association, or
one of the sickness fund associations. Innovative procedures are not
covered until2 the JFC has pronounced their diagnostic and therapeutic
"usefulness."

2

The revised Art. 135229 was further extended to the

226. 2 Neuordnungsgesetz NOG. BGBL. S. 1520; Bonn, 30. Juni 1997 [Health Care Code
Revision Act II, German Code, June 30, 1997, at 1520].
227. An Administrative Tiger Gets Its Teeth, supra note 224. Wording was also added to

include alternative therapies.

Resolution of the Health Care Committee, Art. 135(1)(1), in

GESETZLICHE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG [SGB V ANNOTATED] 84 (Wilhelm Schmidbauer and

Bernhard Schmidbauer, eds., 2000).
228. Nutzen. The BSG has interpreted this clause as an "exclusion of a procedure from
coverage until approved by the JFC" for purposes of quality control. It also considers the JFC to

hold a decision making monopoly for the coverage of innovative services.

Rolf-Ulrich

Schlenker, Das Entscheidungsmonopol des Bundesausschussesfir neue medizinische Verfahren

und Auflenseitermethoden [The Decisionmaking Monopoly of the Federal Committee for
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evaluation of already covered benefits to ensure their continued usefulness
and appropriateness under the evolving standard of care. No application
by a third party is required, the Committee must act ex officio whenever
information indicative of the need for reevaluation of a covered procedure
or service is received. The JFC has thus become the major coverage
decision maker for outpatient treatment. 21
Furthermore, a Hospital Committee'3 for the evaluation of current and
innovative diagnostic and treatment procedures in hospitals, modeled after
the JFC, was created by the Social-Democratic Reform 2000 under SGB
V, Art. 137(c), thus eliminating an important legislative gap. Evaluations
must be based on the current state of scientific knowledge, and the Art. 92
criteria, "sufficiency, appropriateness and cost-effectiveness," continue to
apply.
Contrary to Art. 135, however, no mention is made of "diagnostic
and therapeutic usefulness," resulting in a less stringent evaluation
standard. This was criticized by the JFC chairman, also sitting on the
Hospital Committee, who expressed concerns related to the absence under
Art. 137(c) of adequate procedures and a sufficient organizational structure
for the initiation and implementation of evaluations, and the promulgation
of Hospital Committee decisions.2 3 Art. 137(e) established a Coordinating
Committee,233 a working group of all associations represented on both the
JFC and the Hospital Committee. Its task is the coordination of committee
activities resulting in a uniform set of criteria for the appropriate and costeffective delivery of in- and outpatient care, relying on evidence-based
clinical practice guidelines. The Committee is expected to issue such
guidelines for at least ten illnesses per annum for which there are
indications of the delivery of inadequate, inappropriate or excessive care,
4
the elimination of which may affect population morbidity and mortality.Conceived as a working group, the Coordinating Committee lacks
independent legal status but its decisions will bind the sickness funds,
Innovative Medical Procedures and Alternative Treatments], 9 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
SOZIALRECHT 411 (1998).

229. Art. 135(1)(3), SGB V.
230. For further discussion, including some of the limitations of the scope of the JFC's
rulemaking authority and resources, see infra.
231. Ausschuss Krankenhaus.
232. Karl Jung, Rechtliche Grundlagen des Bundesausschusses auch nach der GKV-Reform
2000 unzureichend [Inadequate Legal Foundations for the Federal Committee Persist after
Adoption of the Reform 2000], KRANKENVERSICHERUNG 52 (March 2000) [hereinafter
InadequateLegal Foundations].
233. Koordinierungsausschuss.
234. Art. 137(e)(3)(1), SGB V.
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hospitals and plan physicians. 35' So far, neither the Hospital Committee
nor the Coordinating Committee have promulgated guidelines. Whether
and how they will be able to accomplish their mission remains to be seen.
2. Rulemaking Procedures
Art. 92, as of its earliest version in 1988, has mandated notice and
comment procedures for JFC coverage guideline development. Initially
limited to the prescription drug guideline, the article required that experts
in pharmacology, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry and the
pharmacist associations were to be heard.2

6

It was amended to currently

include the medical specialty associations for alternative treatments, the
midwives association, the organizations representing the manufacturers and
service providers for prosthetic devices, hearing aids, other medical
devices and equipment, the providers of preventive and rehabilitative
services, both public and private home care providers, and dental
technicians. At the Committee's discretion, additional parties may be
heard. All opinions must be duly considered and included in the final
coverage guideline decision. Deliberations are not open to the public.
The neutral JFC chairman has criticized the absence of a coherent
legislative concept covering all procedural aspects of the hearing process
such as the scope of notice and comment, the specific parties to be heard,
whether comments should be presented orally or in writing, when and to
which extent documentation should be made public and responses to
requests for information be provided, and the absence of a well-defined
obligation of the JFC to justify its decisions .237 The Committee therefore
issued additional, more stringent rules of procedure specifying, for
example, that any interested party may be heard or submit comments, once
appropriate notice of the subjects under consideration has been given.
Comments are distributed to all Committee members.
235. The sickness funds and Social-Democratic members of Parliament would have

preferred a corporate entity under public law, making the Coordinating Committee a strong
umbrella organization for all federal committees.
236. This was the result of the lobbying onslaught on the federal government before the

reference price system was adopted as one of the major innovations of the new SGB V. With
drug profit margins for both manufacturers and pharmacies exceeding the international average

by far, the government introduced reimbursement ceilings by drug, the so-called "reference
prices." These do not apply across the board, exempting innovative and patented drugs, for
example. Currently, 46.5% of total drug expenditures by the universal health care system cover
medication subject to reference prices.
Bundeskartellamt stoppt neue Festbetrige fir
Medikamente [FederalAntitrust Agency stays new Reference Pricesfor Drugs], FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Jan. 29, 2001, at 13. In spite of the price regulations, drug supply

shortages as currently experienced in the United States are unlikely in Germany.
237. InadequateLegal Foundations, supra note 232, at 53.
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Art. 135, contrary to Art. 92, does not contain any notice and
comment clauses, considered to be a serious legislative omission since the
Art. 135 process leads to coverage exclusions while the Art. 92 process
rarely does. Once again critical of the legislators' abdication, the JFC
issued its own procedural guidelines .238 Medical services to be evaluated
must be clearly defined and their indication specified. The JFC working
groups must give notice of the procedures to be evaluated in the Federal
Register and in the Deutsches Arzteblatt.2 3 9 Comments are solicited from
medical experts, specialty societies, and, whenever relevant, from
associations of manufacturers of medical products and equipment. The
working groups may hear expert testimony, and both written and oral
opinions should be based on a questionnaire developed by the respective
working group. Adequate time must be provided for the submission of
comments.
Applications for innovative procedure coverage under Art. 135 must
describe the usefulness of the new procedure, its medical necessity, and its
cost-effectiveness compared to already covered care. The "usefulness" of
the procedure must be supported by effectiveness studies for the specified
indication, evidence of the therapeutic results of a diagnostic procedure,
outcome evaluations including side-effects, and usefulness data in
comparison with other procedures used for the same purpose. "Medical
necessity" is to be shown through data detailing the relevance of the
clinical issue, the epidemiology of the syndrome, the spontaneous course
of the illness, and diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives.
"Costeffectiveness" 2'4 must be addressed by estimating costs per patient,
balancing costs and benefits per patient, balancing costs and benefits for
the insured community, including follow-up costs, and by balancing costs
and benefits in comparison with other treatment approaches.
Because the JFC must prioritize applications, data showing the
diagnostic/therapeutic relevance for certain illnesses, the inherent risks of
the procedure and its likely economic impact should also be submitted.

238. Richtlinien des Bundesausschusses der 4rzte und Krankenkassen aber die Einfiihrung
neuer Untersuchungs and Behandlungsmethoden und iber die Uberpruifung erbrachter
vertragsarztlicherLeistungen gemdaj §135 Abs. I i. V. m. §92 Abs. 1 Satz 2 Nr. 5 SGB V, 1.
Jan. 1998 [Guidelines of the Joint Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Fundsfor the
Coverage of Innovative Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures and the Evaluation of Covered
Medical Services Under §135(1) in Conjunction with §92(1)(5)], in HAUCK, supra note 208, C
455, at 1 (Jan.1, 1998).
239. This is the official publication of the Federal Physician Association.
240. The JFC cost-effectiveness definition strives to avoid being "one-eyed," see
Bundesausschiisse der Arzte und Krankenkassen, supra note 209, by requiring the "balancing" of
costs and benefits and by addressing follow-up costs.
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The JFC then classifies applications for therapeutic innovations according
to: (I) evidence based on at least one randomized, controlled study,
conducted and published in agreement with internationally recognized
standards (good clinical practice, such as GCP according to Consort); (Ila)
evidence derived from other prospective studies with clinical intervention;
(lib) cohort or case-controlled studies, preferably involving more than one
group of subjects; (1Ic) time-series studies or comparisons between sites
with and/or without clinical intervention; (III) opinions of recognized
experts, correlational observations, pathophysiological discussions or
descriptions; expert committee reports, consensus conferences, case
studies.
Diagnostic procedures are classified by considering: (I) evidence
based on at least one randomized, controlled study, conducted and
published in agreement with internationally recognized standards; (Ila)
evidence based on prospective diagnostic studies using validated numerical
targets (so-called "gold standards"), conducted under routine clinical
conditions accompanied by sensitivity, specificity and predictive value
calculations; (IIb) evidence derived from studies using populations with a
health status determined at the outset of the study using validated numerical
targets (gold standards), indicating at least sensitivity and specificity data;
(IIc) evidence from studies of populations with a predetermined health
status using non-validated diagnostic coefficients resulting in at sensitivity
and specificity data; (III) opinions of recognized experts, correlational
observations, pathophysiological discussions or descriptions; expert
committee reports, consensus conferences, case studies.
Whenever the JFC has approved an innovative therapeutic or
diagnostic procedure, recommendations
for required provider
qualifications, equipment standards and quality control measures are
published simultaneously in order to ensure the appropriate application of
the new method. The national sickness fund and physician associations
may then jointly issue additional detailed quality control requirements.
Procedures rejected as not meeting the statutory coverage criteria are
publicized as well.
Should the JFC have failed to rule on a new procedure or have done
so in a timely fashion'41 but treatment -was provided and reimbursement
denied by the sickness fund, patients may bring an action before the social
courts under Art. 13, SGB V, allowing payment for care required by
241. Systemversagen.

Whenever the JFC has failed to rule on the coverage of a new

method in a timely fashion, the reimbursement of services will be permitted under Art. 13,
contingent on case-by-case medical necessity determinations by the sickness funds and their

Medical Services.
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individual circumstances.
The social court will then apply the
"acceptance" standard to determine whether the procedure has become part
of medical practice and is supported in the literature. Sickness fund
payment decisions, however, are based on effectiveness and
2
appropriateness criteria, a contradiction not yet resolved by the BSG.
Since the Court has concluded that the judiciary lacks the competence to
make "medical-scientific" determinations-' , and the legislative has
conveniently delegated most of the responsibility for politically difficult
choices to the JFC, patients, according to some authors, are left without
the protection of the law.,"

3. Conclusion
In spite of the remaining procedural weaknesses, the coverage
determination process is public and transparent. Both Arts. 92 and 135
refer to generally recognized or prevailing standards of medical knowledge
as standard for currently covered and innovative benefits. Patients are
entitled to care in keeping with the progress of medical science (Art. 2),
and physicians are obligated to provide it (Art. 70). According to the JFC
chairman, coverage guidelines should therefore be based on the expertise
of competent organizations and institutions45 , and on evidence-based
criteria reflecting the prevailing standards and scientific progress inherent
in clinical practice guidelines (CPGs). These are also relied upon by
experts whose comments on proposed coverage guidelines are required by
law or JFC statutes. CPGs are developed by medical specialty societies,
the Federal Physicians' Chamber,- " and the AWMF (Working Group of
Scientific-Medical Societies). The Chamber and the Federal Physician
Association& (represented on the JFC) have jointly established a

242. Schlenker, supra note 228, at 415.
243. BSGE 81, 54, 70, 72.
244. Ruth Schimmelpfeng-Schuitte, Richtliniengebung durch den Bundesausschujl der Arzte
und Krankenkassen und demokratische Legitimation [JFC Guidelines and Democratic
Legitimacy], 11 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALRECHT 530, 534 (1999).

245. Clinical PracticeGuidelines Viewed by the FederalCommittee, supra note 222.
246. Bundesarztekammer. Its regional member chambers (Landesdrztekammern), corporate
entities under public law, represent physicians' interests, and adopt and implement the rules for
the practice of medicine.

They are roughly comparable to U.S. state boards monitoring the

application of the professional code of ethics, continuing education requirements, and other rules
and regulations controlling the exercise of the medical profession.

All are components of the

system of health care self-governance.
247. Arbeitsgemeinschaft der wissenschaftlichen medizinischen Fachgesellschaften.
AWMF's website is available for view at http://www.uni-duesseldorf.de/WWW/AWMF.

The

570 ILSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 8:507
Clearinghouse for Medical Quality Control. 48 It develops CPGs for inand outpatient delivery of care, supports both federal associations when
contracting with sickness funds and hospitals, and coordinates the quality
control activities of all associations on the federal level. It has also issued
a "checklist for guidelines," a step-by-step roadmap to ensure guideline
quality and validity. In 1999, all federal entities of the system of selfgovernance representing physicians, sickness funds and hospitals adopted a
joint project to promote the quality of guidelines in cooperation with the
AWMF. Based on both Clearinghouse and AWMF criteria, a Guideline
Manual for the development, adaptation or implementation of guidelines
was published in October 2000.249 Increasing cooperation among all parties
will contribute to quality of care improvements since valid CPGs translated
into coverage guidelines would influence the daily practice of medicine. 2m
E. The Democratic Legitimacy of
Guidelines

the Federal Committee

1. The Guidelines' Legal Status
Public law associations autonomously adopt charters which have the
force of law. But laws must result from a democratically legitimate
process: associations, representing a limited number of citizens for a
particular purpose, must have democratically constituted rulemaking bodies
such as elected assemblies and boards. Sickness fund and physician
associations meet this requirement but the democratic legitimacy of the
Joint Federal Committee and its coverage guidelines has been a matter of
much dispute. The SGB V of 1988 strengthened the normative force of the
guidelines by integrating them into the federal collective agreements
negotiated by the federal associations of sickness funds and physicians, and
thus into the regional collective agreements as well. But the legal status of
the guidelines and their external application to the insureds continues to be
discussed and questioned in the literature.
Until 1996, the BSG had held that guidelines were only internal
administrative rules binding the JFCs' member associations, without
248. 'rztliche Zentraistelle Qualittssicherung. This organization considers and uses
standards and definitions of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the former Agency for
Healthcare Policy and Research (AHCPR).
249. Leitlinien-Manual, at http://www.uni-duesseldorf.de/AWMF/ll/llmanual.htm.
The
Manual, with 2001 updates, is available at this site for purchase or for download in Adobe
Portable Document File format.
250. Whenever clinical practice guidelines become part of the social law coverage
guidelines, the physicians' conflict between the cost-containment requirements of social law and
the civil law malpractice standard is resolved as CPGs represent the civil law standard of care.
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normative effects on individual sickness funds and providers. Guidelines
could be applied to such third parties"' only through their integration into
the regional association charters.2 2 Furthermore, guidelines could not limit

2
members' material claims to comprehensive health care under Art. 27 .13
The BSG thus gave clear precedence to the coverage and benefit
entitlement sections (Chapter Three, Arts. 11-66) of the SGB V over its
administrative health care delivery sections (Chapter Four, Arts. 69-140),
emphasizing the rights of patients to treatment over administrative

decisions by the JFC (established by Art. 91 of Chapter Four).-

This

approach also helped bridge the inconsistencies between the coverage and
health care delivery aspects of the law, enabled the providers to provide
legal individualized services, protected the patients, and required the
sickness funds to accept medical judgment. Concurrently, physicians were
bound by the coverage guidelines and all collectively agreed upon
contractual conditions of health care delivery.
On March 20, 1996,2- however, the Supreme Social Court ruled that
the JFC is an "institution" under public law with rulemaking authority
limited to specific interpretations of the law.Even though such
institutions, contrary to corporate "entities" under public law, are
established to fulfill a certain purpose without the democratic
representation of members, they too may adopt charters and participate in
a system of self-governance. Relying on SGB V, Art. 92(8) (the JFC
coverage guidelines are components of the federal collective agreements
between sickness fund and physician associations), Art. 82 (the federal
collective agreements determine the terms of the regional agreements),
Art. 83 (the regional agreements are binding for the sickness funds), Art.
251. Drittwirkung; Aussenwirkung.

252. Prior to 1988, guidelines were declared "binding" in the charters of the regional
sickness fund and physician associations, endowing them with only questionable applicability to
third parties. This issue had never been resolved. Ebsen, supra note 195.
253. Peter Hinz, Der Bundesausschuss der Arzte und Krankenkassen-Status and Aufgaben
[The Joint Federal Committe-Status and Mandate], 7 DIE LEISTUNGEN 385 (July 2000).
254. This was also a reflection of the historical development of German health care law:
one of the original purposes of the contractual arrangements between physicians and sickness

funds was the delivery of health care for favorable fees. Wolfgang Gitter & Gabriele K6hlerFleischmann, Gedanken zur Notwendigkeit und Wirtschaftlichkeit von Leistungen in der
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung and zur Funktion des Bundesausschusses der Arzte und
Krankenkassen [Reflections on the Necessity and Cost-Effectiveness of Benefits under the SGB V
and the Function of the Joint Federal Committeel, 1 DIE SOZIALGERICHTS BARKEIT 1 (1999).
255. BSG 6 Rka 62/94, March 20, 1996, Methadonurteil ["The Methadone Ruling ], 3
MedR 123 (1997).
256. Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts mit begrenzter Rechtsfahigkeit mit der Aufgabe der
konkretisierendenRechtssetzung.
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95 (the regional agreements bind individual providers), and Art. 81(the
regional physician association charters must contain clauses to make the
guidelines binding on association members), the Court reversed its earlier
interpretation of the law and held that the JFC guidelines have the same
normative effect on sickness funds and physicians as the federal and
regional collective agreements concluded by their associations. This
confirmed the separate rulemaking authority of the Joint Federal
Committee, independent of its constituent corporate entities under public
law governing the health care system. Furthermore, the BSG reversed the
primacy of the SGB V coverage and benefit entitlement sections over the
sections regulating the administration of the health care delivery system,
thus permitting administrative interventions in an area so far mainly
controlled by physicians.
The applicability of the new approach to the patients as third parties
was resolved by analyzing the internal consistency of the law.21 7 Chapter

Three (coverage and benefits) of the SGB V calls for JFC guidelines
detailing the material claims for benefits by members under SGB V, Arts.
27 (a)(4) for fertility treatment, and Art. 29(4) for orthodontics in
agreement with Art. 92 of Chapter Four (the health care delivery system).
Without such a specific mandate, Art. 92(1) was considered the default
clause granting general JFC rulemaking authority ("Guidelines must be
adopted to ensure the sufficient, adequate and cost-effective delivery of
care"). According to the BSG, Art. 92(1) is logically related to Art. 12(1)
of Chapter Three, requiring the "sufficient, adequate and cost-effective"
provision of benefits to individual patients. Art. 72(2) of Chapter Four
once again reiterates these terms when stipulating the joint obligation of
sickness fund and provider associations to deliver care. The BSG thus
found the guideline application to patients to be implied in the SGB V.
Five BSG decisions, announced on September 16, 1997,58 confirmed
the far-reaching delegation of rulemaking authority to the JFC,5 9 dubbed
"one of the traditional components of German health care law" by the
Court.
In all five cases, the BSG denied patients' claims for
reimbursement by the sickness funds of treatments not considered covered

257. BSG 6 Rka 62/94, March 20, 1996; Hinz, supra note 253.
258. BSG 1 RK 28/95, SozR 3-2500 §135 No. 4.; BSG Az 1 RK 17/95; 1 RK 14/96; 1 RK
30/95; 1 RK 32/95.
259. The BSG assumed the constitutionality of the scope of the delegation by declaring that

the Constitution does not contain a numerus clausus provision, limiting the categories of
rulemaking approaches. Still, the constitutionality of the Committee rulemaking authority is
hotly contested by constitutional law scholars and experts. The final arbiter, the Constitutional
Court, has not yet been seized with the issue.
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by the SGB V. Three decisions relied on the exclusion by the JFC of
immuno-augmentative therapy for multiple sclerosis from coverage. 260
Building on the March 3, 1996, opinion, the Court considered the
binding normative effect of the JFC guidelines on patients as flowing from
the systematic unity of SGB V Chapters Three and Four. The analysis
turned in particular on Art. 2, entitling members to the provision of
benefits in accordance with the prevailing state of medical knowledge and
the progress of medical science. The JFC was thus given a central role in
coverage decision making under the SGB V, shifting more of the complex
application of the SGB V from legislators to a body of experts. This
responsibility is shared with federal and regional physician and sickness
fund associations which must initiate the innovative treatment evaluation
but may not block nor delay such proceedings which are subject to the Art.
2 provisions.36' But in light of the multitude and complexity of prevailing
and innovative practices, and the resources required for their evaluation,
the current capacity of the JFC to rule on comprehensive coverage while
ensuring adequate transparency and the rule of law is in doubt.
Furthermore, the scope of the JFC rulemaking authority has been
successfully challenged in court. The BSG, even though recognizing the
Committee's authority to issue guidelines to "concretize" the general
health care entitlement clauses of the SGB V, limited the Committee's
ability to adopt exclusions. 62 It rejected the JFC Viagra coverage
exclusion argument that sickness funds would be prevented from
"appropriately managing" the cost-effective provision of health care as
merely addressing administrative difficulties, insufficient justification for a
coverage exclusion reserved to the legislator under Art. 34, SGB V.263
Because erectile dysfunction meets the statutory definition of illness of Art.
27, SGB V, and can have differing etiologies (in this case a chronic, ageunrelated condition), the JFC may not prohibit reimbursement of a drug
approved for its effectiveness independent of a patient's individual
circumstances. Relying on the BSG opinion, a state court approved

260. In another case, the treatment received by one of the plaintiffs was not considered the
prevailing standard of care since practiced by one physician only. In the fifth case, the
reimbursement of acupuncture for neurodermitis was denied because medical science had not
increasingly relied on such treatment for this indication.
261. Schlenker, supra note 228, at 415.
262. BSGE 85, 36, 45, Sept. 30, 1999. 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2764
(Sept. 2000).
263. Art. 34, SGB V, excludes from coverage most over-the-counter medication. It also
allows the Secretary of Health to exclude by regulation additional drugs, adjunctive therapies,
and durable medical equipment of questionable usefulness.
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coverage for a patient afflicted with diabetes.26' In another case before the
BSG, the Court reversed the JFC exclusion of medically indicated podiatric
services, referring to the authority of the Secretary of Health to regulate
adjunct therapies under Art. 34.261 Both BSG rulings clarify that the
guidelines may "concretize" adequate, appropriate and cost-effective care
but may not exclude from coverage a particular illness nor adjunct
therapies and specific drugs, a power reserved to the Secretary of Health.
In addition, one state court, ruling in three cases brought by three
pharmaceutical companies, imposed temporary injunctions against the
prescription drug guideline in 1999.2 A state supreme court, finding that
all provisions of the guideline applicable to the products of a
pharmaceutical manufacturer violated antitrust law, issued an injunction in
January 2000.67 The JFC chairman deplored these actions leading to a
temporary stay of the development of guidelines potentially subject to
further antitrust actions, accused physicians and the pharmaceutical
industry of jointly stymieing all efforts to "clean up" the drug market, and
called for a legislated solution. 26 He also advocated exclusive social court

jurisdiction over guideline-related issues as matters of public not civil law.
The national legislature under Social Democratic leadership agreed and
amended Art. 69, SGB V accordingly. Since sickness funds and their
associations are exercising a public law function, they do not act as private
law corporations, and antitrust law does not apply.2 9
2. Legal Norms Based on Contract?
As most elements of the German health care system, collective norm
setting based on contract is rooted in history.270 Many of the provisions of

264. SG Luneburg, S 9 KR 97/99, Feb. 2, 2000. 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
2766 (Sept. 2000).
265. BSG B 1 KR 9/97 R. Nov. 16, 1999.
266. LG Hamburg, AZ 315-0-115/99, 129/99, 143/99 (March 31, 1999).
267. OLG Mnchen (Jan. 1,2000).
268. Inadequate Legal Foundations, supra note 232. Before the adoption of the SGB V in
1988, more than 60,000 prescription and OTC drugs were on the German market, often
combining different active ingredients without therapeutic justification but favored by the
"consumer" and the drug companies. Currently, 40,000 drugs remain.
269. HAUCK, supra note 208, at Art. 69. See also GESETZLICHE KRANKENVERSICHERUNG
[SGB V ANNOTATED] 44 (Wilhelm Schmidbauer et al.,eds., 2000) (discussing legislative
intent). Inaddition, the relationships between sickness funds and their associations and providers
and their associations are regulated exclusively by Chapter Four, SGB V. See generally Art. 69,
SGB V.
270. This section isbased on Klaus Engelmann, Untergesetzliche Normsetzung im Recht der
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung durch Vertrage und Richtlinien [Rulemaking Through
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the civil law Berlin Agreement of 1913, regulating the relationship between
physicians and sickness funds, were entered into the national insurance act
of 1923. The Joint Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds, one of
the historical predecessors of the current JFC, was instituted to resolve the
details of health care delivery by plan physicians through the issuance of
Their main purpose was to
(then indirectly normative) "guidelines."
facilitate the cooperation between physicians and sickness funds, with only
minor references to coverage. Eventually, the contractual relationships
between physicians and sickness funds began to evolve into collective
agreements which became the foundation of the health care system of selfgovernance when the national insurance act was revised in 1932.
Furthermore, medical care has always been prepaid. 21' Sickness funds
as the "arrangers" of health care contracted with providers for the delivery
of services. Therefore, norms based on contracts helped specify the details
of the provision of prepaid care, a process carried forward through
successive versions of the national health care law. Today, the SGB V
requires collective contracts between physician and sickness fund
associations as corporate entities under public law, mandated to jointly
guarantee and govern health care delivery. JFC guidelines are seen as
collectively agreed-upon norms characteristic of the German health care
system. 72 But how legitimate are the guidelines?
On September 16, 1997,271 the BSG ruled that patients' claims to
health care are limited by the coverage definition of Chapter Four of the
SGB V, regulating the delivery of health care and the issuance of coverage
guidelines. "This Chapter determines the extent of coverage materially
and formally; the insureds may not claim benefits beyond coverage as
defined herein." The general statutory claim to comprehensive coverage in
case of illness of Chapter Three (Art. 27) thus was made subject to
2 4
Opponents of the
interpretation by rulemaking as delegated to the JFCY.
now expanded normative character of the coverage guidelines consider the
delegation of such rulemaking authority to the JFC a violation of
fundamental constitutional rights, based upon the non-delegation
Collective Contracts and Coverage Guidelines as a Component of the Health Care Act], 1 NEUE
ZEITSCHRFIT FOR SOZIALRECHT 1, (2000).
271. This system was preferred over indemnity plans as guaranteeing more "social
protection" but also more control over the appropriate, adequate and cost-effective delivery of

care for the country. Id.
272. Rechtssetzung durch Vertrag. Engelmann, supra note 270, n.255.
273. Engelmann, supra note 270, n.241 (citing BSG 1 RK 28/95, SozR 3-2500 §135 No.

4).
274. Health care has now joined environmental protection and other complex technical and

scientific fields for which traditional laws have become inadequate mechanisms of control.
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doctrine. 27 - Fundamental rights and values, including "freedom, life and
physical inviolability" 276 , are subject only to the legislative powers of

parliament. Whether a fundamental right has been violated is to be
27
analyzed case-by-case by the Constitutional Court. It has been argued,
however, that the coverage and health care delivery sections (Chapter
Four) of the SGB V are complex, and legislating details of the provision of
medical services exceeds the resources of parliament. For decades, "the
judiciary has proven that it is capable of construing vague statutory terms
and clauses without diminishing the protection of the law afforded to the
people.

278

Even when accepting the validity of rulemaking delegation to the JFC
on behalf of physician and sickness fund associations, some authors
question the applicability of JFC guidelines to the patients. In 1996, the
6th Senate of the BSG ruled that patients were "passive beneficiaries", not
active participants in the implementation of the health care law, and no
separate justification for the extension of guideline applicability to them
was required. But are violations of the non-delegation doctrine really
contingent on individuals' active or passive role within a norm setting
process, or isn't it rather the degree to which the ensuing norm affects
their rights? 27 9 The 1st Senate, in 1997, concurred with the 6th Senate
while dissenting from its analysis: JFC guidelines as norms based on
collective contracting are integral elements of a system of rules intended to
ensure the provision of medical care, and thus applies to all patients.
Some authors, however, consider the patients' absence from the
rulemaking process as undermining its democratic legitimacy.
Another strand of criticism cuts even more deeply. It disputes the
norm setting authority of physician and sickness fund associations, partners
275. Raimund

Wimmer,

Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an

untergesetzliche

Rechtsetzung im Vertragsarztrecht, [ConstitutionalLimitations to Normsetting Procedures under
the SGB V Health Care ProviderSections], 9 MEZINRECHT 425 (1996).
276. Constitution of the Federal Republic, Art. 2(2). In combination with Art. 20 ("The
Federal Republic is a democratic, socially responsible state"), the rights to an existential

minimum, health care and informed consent ("patient autonomy") have been inferred by the
Constitutional Court.
277. Klaus Engelmann, Das Rechtskonkretisierungskonzept des SGB V und seine
dogmatische Einordnung durch das Bundessozialgericht [The Construction of the SGB V and its
Dogmatic Classificationby the Supreme Social Court], in ARZTLICHE LEITLINIEN: EMPIRIE UND
RECHT PROFESSIONELLER NORMSETZUNG [MEDICAL GUIDELINES: EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR SETTING PROFESSIONAL NORMS] (Dieter Hart, ed., 2000).
Justice
Engelmann is Chief Justice of the 6th Senate of the Supreme Social Court.

278. Id.
279. Schimmelpfeng-Schiitte, supra note 244, at 533.
280. Id.
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to the collective agreements. Hence none of the institutions established by
them, including the JFC, may issue any generally applicable rules or
coverage guidelines. The legislator should remedy this "legal vacuum"
because of guideline impact on the constitutional rights of patients,
providers, and of those who sell to the health care system.21 ,
Others argue alternatively that the increasing complexity of allocative
and medical decision making requires an effective intermediate-level
system of norms, consisting of collective agreements and guidelines,
constituting flexible elements of law with limited applicability, and
promoting the interplay between the state, the legislator, administrative
entities, and other relevant institutions such as public and private
associations.rn While funding was not an issue, health care laws could be
executed satisfactorily through the application of professionally and
medically-scientifically derived standards, preserving the quality of the
provision of care. But at a time when health care cost containment
measures are considered unavoidable, decision making must be delegated
to administrative rulemaking entities of the system of self-governance to
ensure the continued availability of "sufficient, appropriate and costeffective" care,2 3 respecting the standard mandated by law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Two more divergent approaches to coverage and "medical necessity"
are difficult to conceive. The German health care code, the SGB V, may
appear overly complex to American readers, "big government" seemingly
practicing medicine and limiting individual freedom. But the code was
drafted to protect the dignity and autonomy of patients and their families at
times of need, the autonomy of providers to practice medicine according to
the standards and values of their profession, and to guarantee a high
standard of care for everyone. In this spirit, the SGB V mandates
comprehensive universal coverage for the prevention, diagnosis, and
treatment of illness. Only physicians can translate these general material
claims to care into specific benefits. They must assess each individual
patient's circumstances and provide or arrange for needed procedures and

281. Raimund

Wimmer,

Grenzen der Regelungsbefugnis in der vertragsarztlichen

Selbstverwaltung [Limits of Rulemaking Authority within the System of Physician SelfGovernance], 3 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALRECHT 3 (1999).
282. Robert Francke, Richtlinien, Normsetzungsvertrageund neue Behandlungsmethoden im
Rechtskonkretisierungskonzept des Bundessozialgerichts [Coverage Guidelines, Norm Contracts
and Innovative Medical Procedures: New Approaches to Interpreting Legislation as seen by the

Supreme Social Court], 1 DIE SOZIALGERICHTSBARKEIT 8 (Jan. 1999).
283. Id.
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services. The SGB V thus relies on physician autonomy for the
appropriate case-by-case delivery of health care, according to the
prevailing standards of medical practice and in keeping with the progress
of medical science.
Clinical decisionmaking, however, must respect the boundaries set by
budgets for practices by specialty, adjusted for regional variations of risk,
and for prescription drugs. 29'

Furthermore, capitation for some basic

services shifts part of the morbidity risk to providers who, just as their
American colleagues, must now micro-allocate care. Sickness funds and
physician associations jointly conduct economic reviews of individual
physicians' practices. Individual or collective monetary sanctions are
imposed for expenditures exceeding a predetermined range. National
coverage "guidelines" for innovative treatments and technology result in
another, increasingly weighty, limitation on physician autonomy. But
guidelines by law are jointly negotiated by sickness funds and physician
organizations, just as aspects of quality control, standards of care, and
physician compensation. Through their participation in the collective selfgovernance of the health care system, physicians therefore have a formal
role in the decision making process affecting the exercise of their
profession. Resulting from the communitarian German tradition of social
insurance, the health care system enjoys a high degree of acceptance
among both members and providers, and proposed amendments trigger a
heated, sometimes acrimonious, public debate. Recent reform and cost
control efforts have met with general discontent, and any fundamental
modifications would be rejected by all parties concerned.
In the United States, coverage for a majority of the population is
negotiated between private managed care companies and employers.
Policies list benefits and exclusions, while internal guidelines and criteria
subject physicians' treatment proposals to stringent corporate "medical
necessity determinations, "2 effectively transferring medical decision
making to a third party outside of the physician-patient relationship. Many
284. The current system of funding health care by assessing personal income up to a
specific bracket has been criticized because sickness fund revenue becomes insufficient at times
of high unemployment, early retirement to promote job creation, and an aging population.
Health care fund availability is thus limited by external factors such as labor market policies and
demographics. Sickness funds may not raise premiums as the law mandates "premium stability."
285. See M. Gregg Bloche, Medical Care and the Enigma of Efficiency, in SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1999),
available at
RESEARCH NETWORK ELECTRONIC PAPER COLLECTION 71
See also Lothar Krimmel, Was ist
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf~abstract-id=184275.
"medizinisch notwendig"? [What is "Medically Necessary '?], 94 DEUTSCHES ARZTEBLATr, at

C16 (1997) (stating that "medical necessity" is considered "vacuous" and a "meaningless
metaphor" in both countries). Dr. Krimmel is past president of the Federal Physician
Association.
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physicians' clinical autonomy is subject to additional corporate control
through payment arrangements (financial incentives and capitation) and
provider profiling.
Practitioners exceeding corporate utilization and
appeals benchmarks are dropped from the managed care network.
Physicians, lacking the protection of national health care legislation and an
effective system of self-governance, are prohibited by antitrust law from
forming unions to negotiate quality of services, working conditions, and
payment with managed care corporations.
Considerable nationwide
dissatisfaction with the current health care delivery system has led to the
adoption of several contradictory "patients' rights bill" by Congress and
increasingly comprehensive state legislation regulating managed care
practices.
Common to both countries are cost containment efforts through
standardized practice guidelines. Managed care guidelines, both corporate
and commercial, are often considered "proprietary," and the methodology
for their development is not available for public scrutiny.
German
guidelines, promulgated according to social law requirements, result from
a notice and comment administrative rulemaking procedure relying on
expert input but criticized because not yet completely transparent. In both
countries, guidelines developed according to scientific and evidence-based
criteria by medical societies do not yet have a major influence on medical
practice. "A negative consequence of being sponsored by a voluntary
professional organization is the lack of financial support to widely
distribute information." 2 6 In Germany, however, efforts are under way to
develop the growing number of guidelines adopted by the Joint Federal
Committee through formal cooperation with medical societies.
In both countries, there is also a clear recognition that guidelines
alone can not resolve the dilemma of how to increase cost-effectiveness
without compromising the delivery and quality of necessary care. "How to
quantify quality is the underlying issue, unresolved under current law,
perhaps defying any kind of resolution."2 7 Many prevailing practices have
not been evaluated and many are not amenable to empirical validation.
Furthermore, some of the most fundamental aspects of good medical care,
effective clinical support and comfort at the bedside, can not be cast into
standardized practice guidelines or subjected to a cost-effectiveness
analysis. Any efforts to remove such "waste" from health care to increase
efficiency would be misguided and ignore one of the basic purposes of
medicine. 8,
286. GARTNER & MEE-LEE, supra note 28, at 13.
287. HAUCK, supra note 208, K § 12, at 8.

288. Bloche, supra note 285.
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In the United States, there is a growing awareness that universal
access to health care would remedy much of the failings of the current
market-dominated system, singular among industrialized nations. "If this
moment-a moment of unprecedented economic prosperity and looming
budget surpluses-is the wrong one for an aggressive move towards
universal health insurance, when will it be right?"2' But any fundamental
changes to the health care system would have to be supported by culture
and societal values. In the United States, the emphasis traditionally has
been on individualism, the protection of individual rights, and the
protection from "government interference." In Germany, solidarity among
members of the national community-implying both rights and
obligations-is the foundation of social insurance. Social law is seen as
protective of the rights of individuals while codifying their obligations and
those of society.
But laws, regulations and charters, drawn too complex and too
restrictively, may impose excessive duties on individuals and the economy.
Wherever there is reliance on market forces, society gains space, and
government saves money. On the other hand, the market is cold, focused
on profitability, blind to off-balance-sheet side-effects, and indifferent to
politically defined concepts of justice. The state, predominant in the
"magic triangle of state, market, and self-regulation", can weight the
instruments at its disposal: effective administrative law, self-governance,
and the use of market forces. German health care reform efforts continue
to search for the proper balance between them. The more weight is given
to cooperative structures and flexible rulemaking, the more the market
forces become instrumentalized, and the more apparent the ability of legal
norms to protect freedom.2'- In order to restore patient autonomy and
choice of health care options, remove generic clinical decision making
from distant commercial entities and return it to physicians focussed on
their patients' individual needs, a new conception of American health care
law may be required.
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